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This thesis applies Multiah Alagappa’s framework for analyzing civil-military 
relations in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the post-Deng era, when several key 
developments have fundamentally altered the relationship between the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).  These developments 
include the absence of a powerful paramount leader, the generational shifts in the civilian 
and military leaderships, the increasing professionalization of the PLA, the decline of 
communism as a legitimating ideology, the sustained progress of economic development, 
the emergence of a robust civil society, and the increasing legitimacy of China’s political 
system.  Moreover, this thesis undertakes an extensive review of the various explanations 
and theories advanced in the literature of civil-military relations, asserting that 
Alagappa’s analytical framework offers the most comprehensive tool for analyzing civil-
military relations to date.  Using Alagappa’s analytical framework, this thesis argues that 
the current trend in civil-military relations in China has brought increasing civilian 
supremacy, as the political power and influence of the PLA have diminished over time 
due to the decreasing significance of coercion in governance, the strengthening of non-
coercive state institutions, China’s sustained high level of economic development, and 
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Significant developments in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the past 
two decades have begun to fundamentally alter the relationship between the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).  With the passing of 
Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, there is no longer a paramount leader who commands 
absolute military loyalty and acts as the key arbitrator of policymaking disputes within 
the party.  Today’s top senior civilian leaders in the CCP possess technical and 
bureaucratic backgrounds, but none can lay claim to any significant experience in the 
military.  In terms of identity and function, the PLA has also experienced change.  It has 
transformed itself from a group of ideologically-driven revolutionaries trained under the 
Maoist doctrine of People’s War to an increasingly professionalized body of soldiers that 
operate under a military doctrine focused on meeting external threats outside China’s 
borders. 
These developments in the civilian and military spheres are certain to have a 
profound impact on civil-military relations in China.  Other significant developments in 
China, however, have had broader consequences for the state and society as a whole, and 
these in turn also affect civil-military relations.  With the end of Cold War, communism 
has lost significant appeal as the ideological basis for justifying compliance of the 
military.  Since China opened its economy to the world after 1978, China has rapidly 
modernized and received increasing worldwide attention, fostering greater international 
awareness of developments in China.  China currently possesses one of the fastest 
growing economies in the world and has sustained remarkable levels of economic growth 
since its reform era began.  In order to manage its increasingly complex economy, China 
has necessarily strengthened its state institutions.  Moreover, China’s sustained level of 
economic development has led to the increasing development of socioeconomic and 
political forces within civil society that pose administrative challenges for Beijing. 
How can one explain civil-military relations in China within the context of all 




analyzed?  Most studies on civil-military relations in China have focused primarily on 
party-military interactions with little regard for the effects of coercion (the key function 
of the military), economic development, legitimacy of the political system, and the 
influence of civil society and international actors.  This thesis suggests an alternative 
framework for analyzing the nature of civil-military relations in China within the context 
of these issues. 
B. SCOPE 
This thesis specifically examines civil-military relations in China during the post-
Deng era, which spans from 1995 to the present and coincides with the leadership terms 
of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao (the current PRC leader).  Nevertheless, past trends and 
developments in civil-military relations from the eras of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping 
– which span over five decades – also factor into the analysis presented in this thesis. 
C. METHODOLOGY1 
This thesis employs Multiah Alagappa’s analytical framework for investigating 
and explaining changes and continuities in civil-military relations for China.  This 
framework, first introduced in Alagappa’s book Coercion and Governance: The 
Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, was developed from an extensive study 
on the evolving relationship between the military and the state in sixteen countries in 
Asia. 
In Coercion and Governance, Alagappa argues that the significance or weight of 
coercion in governance in both domestic and international affairs is the key to 
understanding and explaining civil-military relations.  Alagappa posits that there is a 
direct relationship between the weight of coercion in governance and the political power 
and influence of the military.  In other words, as the weight of coercion in governance 
increases or decreases, so does the political power and influence of the military.  The key 
finding in Coercion and Governance is that the weight of coercion in governance in Asia 
is on the decline, and thus leads to the conclusion that there is a long-term trend toward 
                                                 
1This section on Multiah Alagappa’s analytical framework draws heavily from Multiah Alagappa, 
“Investigating and Explaining Change: An Analytical Framework,” in Coercion and Governance: The 





declining political power and influence of militaries in Asia.  Consequently, the 
strengthening of civilian control over the military is likely to persist. 
Alagappa’s analytical framework is divided into two parts: an investigative 
framework and an explanatory framework.  The following sections discuss each part in 
detail. 
1. Investigative Framework 
The key goal of Alagappa’s investigative framework is to determine whether 
civilian supremacy (or military domination) characterizes the nature of civil-military 
relations in a given state and to determine whether civilian supremacy (or military 
domination) is a growing or declining trend.  To accomplish this, the investigative 
framework examines the changes and continuities in civil-military relations by observing 
variations along two key factors of governance: jurisdiction and scope. 
a. Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction is the decision-making authority to formulate and implement 
policy.  With regards to governance, what matters is whether civilian or military elites 
possess jurisdiction over a particular area of governance (i.e., security policymaking).  
There are two types of jurisdiction: 
(1) Ultimate Jurisdiction.  This refers to overall responsibility 
and final decision-making authority in formulating and implementing policies in an area 
of governance. 
(2) Mixed Jurisdiction.  Decision-making authority is split 
between civilian and military institutions.  For instance, the civilian government may 
have ultimate jurisdiction over certain issues while the military may oversee others within 
a particular area of governance. 
b. Scope 
Scope indicates the extent to which the military participates in 







(1) Political Participation.  Of particular interest in this area of 
governance is whether the military serves a key role in maintaining the government and 
regime in power.  Another important aspect is how the military actually participates in 
politics (i.e., serving in an advisory role to civilian politicians or using personal networks 
with civilian politicians to advance military interests). 
(2) Institutional Autonomy.  This area of governance denotes 
the extent to which the military has autonomy over its own organization and 
administration.  Key aspects to investigate include defense budgets, recruitment 
processes, promotions and appointments of senior military leadership, military legal 
systems, and command and control structures. 
(3) Security Policymaking.  Formulating and implementing 
national security policies is closely linked to both the civilian government and the 
military, and thus necessitates the participation of both institutions.  The key question is 
who has ultimate jurisdiction in formulating and implementing national security policies, 
in determining threats to national security, and in defining military strategy. 
(4) Socioeconomic Activities.  Militaries may be engaged in 
socioeconomic activities at the request of civilian governments, especially if state 
institutions are weak in addressing problems of modernization and national development.  
Alternatively, militaries may be engaged in these activities for the purpose of advancing 
their own political power and influence at the expense of strengthening civilian 
institutions.  Whichever the case may be, the key issues are who controls these activities, 
who authorizes them, and whether these activities empower civilian or military 
institutions. 
(5) Illegal Activities.  The extent to which the military 
participates in illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, piracy, smuggling, and extortion, 
can indicate the degree to which the military can undertake acts of insubordination, exert 
improper political influence on civilian governments, and undermine the legitimacy of 
the political system.  Regardless of whether these activities are encouraged by civilian 
governments or not, these activities ultimately affect the relationship between civilian 




c. Civilian Supremacy or Military Domination? 
Civilian supremacy represents the ability of the civilian government to 
formulate and implement policies without military interference, to define the military’s 
role in governance, and to set limits on what the military can do on behalf of the state.  In 
contrast, military domination is the opposite of civilian supremacy.  Whether civilian 
supremacy or military domination is on the rise or decline is determined by the 
combination of jurisdiction and scope over the five areas of governance – political 
participation, institutional autonomy, security policymaking, socioeconomic activities, 
and illegal activities. 
For instance, if civilian elites are found to possess ultimate jurisdiction 
across all five areas of governance, then the balance of civil-military relations leans 
toward civilian supremacy.  In contrast, military domination reigns if the military holds 
ultimate jurisdiction across these same areas.  In addition, mixed jurisdiction between 
civilian and military elites can also occur and would account for varying degrees of 
civilian supremacy or military domination. 
2. Explanatory Framework 
Alagappa’s explanatory framework explains the nature of civil-military relations 
as the outcome of two sets of processes: (1) processes connected to the structures of the 
political system, domestic and global economies, and the salience of coercion in domestic 
and international governance; and (2) processes connected to the interests, power, and 
beliefs of the civilian and military institutions and actors involved, as well as those of 
civil society and international actors.  These processes are advanced by the explanatory 
framework’s two sets of propositions. 
a. Interplay of Coercion, Economic Development, and Political 
Legitimacy 
The first set of propositions contends that the weight of coercion in 
governance is crucial in determining the nature of civil-military relations.  The weight of 
coercion in governance is determined by two important factors: the level of economic 
development of the nation-state and the legitimacy accorded to the political system.  This 
first set of propositions is structural in nature and seeks to explain the long-term trends 




(1) A direct relationship exists between the weight of coercion 
in governance and the political power and influence of the military.  In other words, as 
the weight of coercion in governance decreases, the political power and influence of the 
military also decreases relative to non-coercive state institutions.  This condition allows 
for increasing civilian control of the military.  Alternatively, as the weight of coercion in 
governance increases, the political power and influence of the military also increases and 
thus makes it harder for civilian supremacy to become the norm.  As to how the weight of 
coercion in governance increases or decreases is explained by the next two propositions. 
(2) As the level of economic development increases, the 
weight of coercion in governance decreases.  In contrast, if the level of economic 
development decreases, the weight of coercion in governance increases.  Sustained 
economic development strengthens the need for strong non-coercive state institutions to 
manage an increasingly complex state, society, and economy, thus reducing the reliance 
on coercion to govern the state. 
(3) As the political legitimacy of the nation-state, government, 
and political system increases, the weight of coercion in governance decreases.  In 
contrast, if the political legitimacy decreases, the weight of coercion in governance 
increases.  Therefore, if the government, regime, and state institutions are accorded a 
significant degree of legitimacy and can address problems without relying on coercion (as 
represented by the military) to govern the state, then the weight of coercion in 
governance and the military’s political power and influence would decline. 
b. Interplay of Interests, Power, and Beliefs 
To explain specific developments in civil-military relations, the second set 
of propositions becomes relevant with its focus on the agency level – that is, the level 
concerning key institutions and actors.  It concentrates on the three variables of interests, 
power, and beliefs of key institutions and actors, as well as the nature and strength of 
political systems.  It consists of three main propositions: 
(1) The pattern of civil-military relations (e.g., Leninist-style 
party control of the military) is an outcome of the interaction between the interests, 
power, and beliefs of key civilian and military institutions.  This interaction is regulated 




(2) If a state’s political system is widely accepted, the beliefs 
(principles and norms) of that political system will shape the pattern of civil-military 
relations.  Explaining the specific developments in civil-military relations, however, will 
still depend upon the interplay of competing interests and relative power of key civilian 
and military institutions and actors, as well as the beliefs and power of civil society and 
international actors. 
(3) If a state’s political system is sharply contested or is in 
transition, the interests and distribution of power among the key civilian and military 
institutions and actors become crucial in explaining the specific developments in civil-
military relations.  In this instance, the beliefs and power of civil society and international 
actors also factor significantly into the specific developments in civil-military relations. 
c. Key Points of the Explanatory Framework 
In short, the first set of propositions argues that the weight of coercion in 
governance is the key factor in determining the long-term trends in the nature of civil-
military relations.  The weight of coercion in governance is determined by two key 
factors: the level of sustained economic development and the degree of legitimacy 
accorded to the political system.  The first set is structural in nature and is useful only in 
explaining the long-term trends and developments in civil-military relations. 
To explain specific developments in civil-military relations, the second set 
of propositions is relevant because it focuses on the agency level.  The second set argues 
that specific developments in civil-military relations are determined by the outcome of 
the interaction between the interests, power, and beliefs of the civilian and military 
institutions and actors involved.  This interaction is further influenced by the beliefs and 
power of civil society and international actors. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
The following chapters of this thesis are organized to advance and apply Multiah 
Alagappa’s analytical framework for investigating and explaining long-term trends and 
specific developments in civil-military relations in China. 
Chapter II undertakes an extensive review of literature on civil-military relations.  





explanations, theories, and models advanced by scholars.  Overall, this chapter argues 
that Alagappa’s analytical framework offers the most comprehensive tool for analyzing 
civil-military relations to date. 
Chapter III applies Alagappa’s analytical framework for investigating and 
explaining long-term trends and specific developments in civil-military relations in the 
PRC during the post-Deng era.  As previously discussed in this chapter, Alagappa’s 
analytical framework consists of two parts: an investigative framework and an 
explanatory framework.  This chapter first applies Alagappa’s investigative framework to 
determine whether civilian supremacy or military domination characterizes the current 
nature of PRC civil-military relations in the post-Deng era.  Next, it applies Alagappa’s 
explanatory framework to explain how the nature of civil-military relations in China has 
developed thus far.  Overall, this chapter argues that the current trend in civil-military 
relations in China has been increasing civilian supremacy over the military, since the 
political power and influence of the PLA have diminished due to the decreasing 
significance of coercion in governance, the overall strengthening of non-coercive state 
institutions in China, China’s sustained high level of economic development, and the 
increasing legitimacy of China’s political system. 
Chapter IV concludes this thesis with a summary of the key points presented in 





II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
The study of civil-military relations deals with the relationship between civilian 
authorities and the military.  Specifically, it examines the role of the military within the 
political framework and the degree to which the military is a participant in that 
framework.  Since the military primarily possesses the ultimate means of state coercion, 
and because the military can operate in a highly-organized fashion, the logical 
arrangement in the state-soldier relationship is to have the military subordinated to 
civilian control - in short, civilian supremacy over the military.  In practice, however, this 
is not always the case, as the normative state-soldier relationship can be reversed – the 
military can deploy its coercive assets to dominate the state.  Thus, there is a paradox in 
civil-military relations: how to create a strong military institution that can protect the 
nation-state while preventing it from pursuing state domination.2 
This chapter begins with a discussion on the extensive body of literature on civil-
military relations, which can be classified under one or more of the following categories: 
1) military intervention and non-intervention in politics; 2) the instability of military 
regimes; and 3) civil-military relations in the post-authoritarian state.3  This is followed 
by a discussion on two recent theories of civil-military relations that attempt to offer 
comprehensive explanations of developments in the state-soldier relationship.  The next 
section reviews various models used by China scholars to analyze civil-military relations 
in China.  This chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the important points that 




                                                 
2 Multiah Alagappa, “Investigating and Explaining Change: An Analytical Framework,” in Coercion 
and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 2001), 29. 
3 The following sections (Sections B, C, and D of this chapter) presenting an extensive discussion on 
the various categories of literature on civil-military relations are largely adapted from Alagappa, 




B. MILITARY INTERVENTION AND NON-INTERVENTION IN POLITICS 
Numerous explanations have been offered to explain why militaries intervene or 
do not intervene in politics.  The literature on military intervention in politics can be 
further divided into four sub-categories: 1) military professionalism; 2) military missions 
and roles; 3) weakness of political institutions; and 4) government performance. 
1. Military Professionalism 
Three explanations focusing on military professionalism as the key factor have 
been argued to explain military intervention and non-intervention in politics.  The second 
and third explanations challenge the first. 
a. Professional militaries are apolitical in nature and do not intervene 
in politics.  By contrast, unprofessional militaries are disposed to be political and 
regularly intervene in politics.4 
b. Professional militaries develop corporate interests that may 
motivate military intervention in politics.  Thus, professional militaries are prone to be 
political.5 
c. Professionalization focused on internal security and nation-
building politicizes militaries and leads to their role expansion within the nation-state.6 
This set of explanations offers weak justification for military intervention and 
non-intervention in politics.  Although the professionalism thesis advanced by Samuel 
Huntington has been the most influential for the study of civil-military relations and 
continues to be prevalent with policymakers today, there are many examples in which 
professional militaries have intervened in politics.  The professional and politicized 
                                                 
4 This influential but controversial thesis on military professionalism is expounded in Samuel P. 
Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, 
Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957). 
5 On professionalization as a key factor in military politicization, see Bengt Abrahamsson, Military 
Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972); and Amos 
Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary 
Soldiers (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977). 
6 On professionalization focused on internal security and nation-building as a key factor in military 
politicization, see Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Failures (New Haven, 




militaries of Germany and Japan during World War I run counter to Huntington’s thesis.7  
The militaries of South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia during the 20th century also 
provide counterexamples because these militaries were heavily entrenched within the 
political arena.  Pakistan’s military today is characterized as both professional and 
political.8  Thus, Huntington’s professionalism thesis faces considerable empirical 
challenge. 
As with the other two theses, corporate interests and professionalization focused 
on internal security and nation-building provide weak explanations as to how and why 
militaries intervene in politics.  Although important factors, corporate interests alone do 
not necessarily lead to military intervention because other factors, such as the interests of 
civilian institutions and the beliefs of the governed, must also factor into explaining 
military intervention in politics.  This also applies to the internally-focused 
professionalism thesis. 
2. Military Missions and Roles 
This set of explanations focuses on the missions and roles of the military as the 
key factor for explaining military intervention and non-intervention in politics.  Some 
such explanations include the following: 
a. The continuous threat of war contributes to the political 
ascendance of the military.  As the level of threats to the state increases, military 
domination of politics rises and thus increases the chances for the development of a 
garrison state.9 
b. Specific missions of the military influence the nature of civil-
military relations.  There is a lack of consensus, however, on which type of mission leads 
to stable civilian control.  One scholar has argued that international or external missions 
for the military lead to stable civilian control, while domestic or internal missions lead to 
                                                 
7 Samuel E. Finer, Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall Press, 
1962; reprint, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2002), xvi, 25. 
8 Alagappa, “Investigating and Explaining Change,” 43. 
9 The garrison state thesis was first advanced in Harold D. Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” American 
Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 (January 1941): 455-68.  Also see Harold D. Lasswell, “The Garrison State 
Hypothesis Today,” in Samuel P. Huntington, ed., Changing Patterns in Military Politics (New York, 




a variety of civil-military problems.10  Others posit that the lack of interstate conflicts has 
led to the end of military rule (especially in Latin American countries) and thus has 
helped to develop stable civil-military relations.11 
c. The degree of domestic mobilization for war largely affects civil-
military relations.  There are also conflicting views, however, as to whether a high or low 
degree of domestic mobilization for war contributes to the political ascendance of the 
military.12 
This set of explanations also suffers shortcomings.  The garrison state thesis has 
been largely discredited by the non-emergence of a garrison state among any of the major 
industrialized countries during the Cold War era, especially those with democratic 
regimes.  If the garrison state thesis were true, the Cold War environment would have 
produced a proliferation of garrison states worldwide.  As previously observed above, the 
other two theses focusing on the specific missions of the military and degrees of domestic 
mobilization for war produce inconclusive explanations.13 
3. Weakness of Political Institutions 
This set of explanations argues that the weakness of political institutions in 
addressing and solving problems of the state is the key variable in determining civil-
military relations.  One major explanation advanced in this set connects military 
intervention in politics to the level of political culture – that is, the degree of public 
attachment to civilian institutions and political legitimacy accorded to civilian leaders.  
According to this explanation, the level of political culture largely determines whether 
the military has the opportunity to intervene in politics.  In other words, high levels of 
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political culture (like that of modern industrialized states) obstruct military intervention 
while low levels of political culture (like that of failing states in the Third World) provide 
opportunities for military intervention.  Although the military’s disposition to intervene is 
also an important factor, it is the opportunity as a function of the level of political culture 
which determines military intervention in politics.14 
Another explanation cites the institutional imbalance of development between 
civilian and military institutions as the cause of military intervention in politics.  
Institutions of state control – namely, the bureaucratic and military institutions – are 
usually more highly developed than the political institutions of governance, especially 
during and after the founding moments of newly-independent nation-states.  Thus the 
military and bureaucracy are likely to intervene whenever weak political institutions fail 
to manage the state.15 
This set of explanations does have several good points.  First, this set of 
explanations draws attention to the element of political legitimacy, which is a key factor 
in determining whether the state needs to enforce its right to rule through the use of force.  
Second, it addresses another important element: the relative power distribution between 
civilian and military institutions, which is crucial in explaining which institutions 
dominate others.  Third, it highlights the logical motive for military intervention in 
politics: the inability of a weak civilian government to sustain a viable state that serves 
the governed.16 
Several shortcomings, however, also challenge these explanations.  First, they do 
not explain how civilian or military institutions come to dominate the state and other 
institutions in the first place.  They only explain the opportunities that allow certain 
institutions to dominate other institutions and the state.  Second, they ignore the role of 
coercion, as expressed through the use of military force, in governing the people.  High 
reliance on coercion in governance indicates a civilian government that likely possesses 
                                                 
14 The political culture thesis is expounded in Samuel E. Finer, Man on Horseback: The Role of the 
Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962; reprint, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 
2002). 
15 Fred Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West 
Center Press, 1964). 




low political legitimacy and weak political institutions to address state problems.  Third, 
this set of explanations ignores the political effects of the international system.  
International organizations such as the United Nations, the end of the Cold War, and the 
ascendance of democracy worldwide have had an enormous impact on how militaries can 
influence politics and the role of the military in politics.17 
4. Government Performance 
Another set of explanations argues that the key factor in determining civil-
military relations is government performance and, by extension, the level of economic 
development of the state.  One major explanation asserts that the failure of civilian 
governments to sustain acceptable levels of economic development or mitigate economic 
crises provide opportunities for military interventions.18  Similarly, another explanation 
posits that military coups are the result of low levels of economic development, whereby 
successful coups occur in countries with a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
below $500; unsuccessful coups occur in countries with a per capita GDP of $1000 or 
more; and no coups are attempted in countries with a per capita GDP over $3000.19 
Although the level of economic development is an important factor that provides 
a logical motivation for military intervention in politics, it is not necessarily a 
determining factor.  The 1997 Asian financial crisis, for example, did not provoke any 
military intervention in politics in such countries as South Korea, Thailand, and 
Indonesia; it did, however, lead to change in civilian governments through the democratic 
processes of their respective political systems.  Nevertheless, a sustained level of 
economic development does have value in explaining the growth of political and 
socioeconomic forces within civil society and the emergence of non-coercive state 
institutions (such as those of the legal and judicial branches of the government) in 
governing the state.  These forces combined have a large impact on decreasing the state’s 
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reliance on coercion to govern its people.  Yet, levels of economic development are only 
one important part of the broader picture in analyzing civil-military relations.20 
C. INSTABILITY OF MILITARY REGIMES 
The most predominant view in this literature is that a military regime is 
unsustainable as a form of government.  Literature on the instability of military regimes 
focuses on the problem of the military as a legitimate government and why the military 
exits from the political arena. 
1. Legitimacy Problem 
Four major explanations are advanced to explain why military regimes cannot 
sustain political legitimacy: 
a. Military governments encounter negative legitimacy because they 
are faced with a “performance dilemma” in governing the state.  Not only does poor 
economic performance undermine the military government’s legitimacy, but successful 
economic performance can also undermine legitimacy as well.  This is because sustained 
levels of economic development promote the rise of new socioeconomic forces and 
political interest groups that eventually demand political participation in governance.21 
b. Military governments are authoritarian by nature.  As such, 
military governments tend to distrust political actors and exclude mass political 
participation - preferring stability, hierarchy, and cohesiveness in the management of the 
state and society.22 
c. Political successions of military governments are problematic.  
Since popular elections are non-existent in military regimes, the only options available to 
change incumbent military governments are in fact military coups.  Thus, coups replace 
elections in military regimes.23 
d. Tensions inevitably arise from the contradictory nature of the 
relationship between the military as a government and the military as an institution of the 
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state.  Factionalism, cronyism, and co-optation are likely to occur among those in the 
military who govern and those who command the troops, thus leading to disunity within 
the military establishment itself.24 
This set of explanations usefully highlights the fact that military regimes are 
inherently unable to sustain political legitimacy because of their heavy reliance on 
coercion in governance, their difficulties in managing the military as both an institution 
and a government, and their inability to manage increasingly complex states and 
societies.  Moreover, military regimes are no longer acceptable forms of government 
within the international community and most regard themselves as only temporary 
replacements for civilian regimes.25  It is not surprising that few military regimes have 
ever exceeded twenty years in duration.26 
2. Military Exit from Politics 
Much of the literature on the military’s exit from politics overlaps with that on the 
transitions of authoritarian regimes to democratic rule and focuses on the governments in 
Latin America and Southern Europe.  Multiple explanations have been advanced to 
explain why militaries exit the political arena and these explanations generally attribute 
the phenomena to one of two sets of factors: 1) international factors, such as war, 
international conflicts, international institutional changes, and global economic changes; 
and 2) domestic factors, such as civil war, public unrest, factionalism, and economic 
downturns.27  The important point to glean from this literature, however, is that both 
international and domestic factors contribute to the military’s exit from politics. 
One of the most influential works has been Transitions from Authoritarian Rule 
by Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, who argue that 
international factors are important, but domestic factors play a predominant role in 
contributing to the military’s exit from politics by creating divisions between groups 
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competing for power within authoritarian regimes.  As these divisions increasingly 
widen, competing groups begin to seek out support from those who had been excluded 
from political participation – namely, the general public. 28 
D. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE POST-AUTHORITARIAN 
STATE 
This literature is mostly normative - it focuses on how post-authoritarian states 
should solve problems in civil-military relations, how democratic civilian control can be 
achieved, how power and ideas affect civil-military relations, and what level of 
explanation should be used for analyzing civil-military relations. 
1. Civil-Military Problems in the Post-authoritarian State 
The fundamental problem in civil-military relations of post-authoritarian states is 
keeping the military from gaining or reasserting political power in government while 
maintaining adequate forces to protect the state’s claim to sovereignty.  The predominant 
view in this literature is that civilian control of the military is a critical factor in the 
successful democratization of post-authoritarian regimes.29 
2. Promoting Democratic Civilian Control 
Various measures have been advanced for consolidating democratic civilian 
control in post-authoritarian states.  Huntington, for instance, has offered several 
recommended guidelines for democratizing countries: professionalization of military 
forces; reduction of the size of the military; refocusing the military on international or 
external missions; replacement of top senior military leadership; and reorganization of 
the entire defense establishment.30 
While these measures may be effective for promoting democratic civilian control, 
O’Donnell and Schmitter have argued a more important point: that long-term 
consolidation of democratic civilian control requires the development of strong political 
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institutions, the emergence of effective non-coercive state institutions to address 
socioeconomic problems, reduction in the use of force to govern the state, and the 
prolonged education of civil and military elites in democratic political processes over 
time.31 
3. Role of Power and Ideas 
The distribution of power between civilian and military institutions and their 
respective interests and beliefs is an important factor in consolidating civilian supremacy 
over the military and in producing successful transitions of authoritarian regimes to 
democratic rule.  Felipe Aguero has argued that the distribution of power among civilian 
and military actors matters in determining the outcome of democratic transitions, 
although Aguero accords little weight to the importance of ideas and beliefs.32  Robert 
Dahl has argued that the strength of ideas and beliefs among civilian and military actors 
is crucial to the development of a polyarchy (an alternative term for liberal democracy 
which means “rule by the many”).33 
4. Level of Explanation 
Scholars of democratization have debated extensively on the level of explanation 
required to explain democratic civilian control.  In other words, should research focus on 
the structural factors affecting democratization, such as the international system of 
nation-states and socioeconomic class structures?  Or should studies concentrate on the 
agency level, which centers on the actions and behaviors of individual actors and 
institutions and their consequences for democratic transition and civilian control?  In 
short, which is more relevant for analyzing civil-military relations: the structure or 
agency level of explanation? 
Despite conflicting viewpoints, both structure and agency levels of explanation 
are significant for analyzing civil-military relations.  Structural factors determine the 
conditions and constraints that affect the behavior of individual actors over the course of 
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time.  Structural factors, however, cannot usefully explain specific developments because 
structures do not immediately determine the actions of individual actors.  To account for 
this, the agency level of explanation becomes more relevant by focusing on the cost-
benefit calculations of individual actors which determine their actions and, by extension, 
explain specific developments.34 
E. RECENT THEORIES OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Two theories of civil-military relations have emerged in recent years to provide 
contemporary frameworks for analyzing civil-military relations: 1) a structural theory of 
civil-military relations developed by Michael Desch centering on a state’s internal and 
external threat environment;35 and 2) a rationalist theory of civil-military relations 
developed by Peter Feaver based upon the principal-agent framework.36  Apparently, 
these two theories tackle the structure and agency levels of explanation discussed in the 
previous section of this chapter. 
1. Desch’s Structural Theory of Civil-Military Relations 
In his structural theory of civil-military relations, Desch argues that the overall 
threat environment, comprised of both internal and external threats, with respect to a 
given state constitutes the key factor in determining the pattern of civil-military relations.  
In other words, the structure of domestic and international threats shapes the behavior of 
individual actors, state institutions, and the military, and ultimately affects the strength of 
civilian control of the military.  The combination of a high external threat and a low 
internal threat, for instance, establishes the conditions for increasing civilian control.  The 
United States during the Cold War era, as Desch has argued, illustrates this scenario 
whereby Washington had maintained stable civilian control throughout that period.  In 
contrast, the combination of a high internal threat and a low external threat suggests 
decreasing civilian control, indicative of the worst-case scenario for civil-military 
relations.  The degree of civilian control of the military, however, becomes difficult to 
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assess in “indeterminate threat environments” – specifically, those situations with low 
internal and low external threats, or those with high internal and high external threats.37 
Like other structural theories, Desch’s structural theory of civil-military relations 
cannot usefully explain specific developments, such as military coups and breakdowns in 
civilian control, or directly determine the outcomes of civil-military interactions and 
conflicts.  Thus, Desch’s theory can only indicate the general conditions and constraints 
that indirectly affect, but not directly determine, the degree of civilian control of the 
military.38 
2. Feaver’s Rationalist Theory of Civil-Military Relations 
In contrast to Desch, Feaver proposes an alternative theory of civil-military 
relations that focuses on the agency level.  Feaver’s theory, which he calls “agency 
theory,” derives its logic from the principal agent framework and the rationalist method - 
both widely used in the study of politics.  Agency theory argues that the core of civil-
military relations is the “strategic interaction between civilian principals [superiors] and 
military agents [subordinates].”  Civilian and military actors are considered rational and 
thus decide how to interact based upon a cost-benefit analysis of their respective 
situations.  Civilian actors decide how they will oversee or monitor the military based on 
what they expect of the degree of military obedience.  Military actors decide whether to 
obey orders based on their expectations of whether their disobedience will be detected 
and, if so, whether they will be punished for it.  Expectations of both civilian and military 
actors are determined by material factors and incentives, such as the costs of monitoring 
the military, the degree to which civilian and military interests coincide, and the political 
strengths of the actors involved.  Thus, the strength of civilian control of the military 
depends on whether civilians can detect and punish military disobedience, and whether 
the military can expect to get away with disobedience.39 
Although agency theory is helpful in determining the conditions and factors that 
directly determine specific developments in civil-military relations, it also suffers some 
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shortcomings.  First, agency theory requires large amounts of accurate information on the 
political actors involved – and this is usually unavailable for research in states that deny 
access to such data.  Second, agency theory ignores the impact of broader political 
structures in both the domestic and international context.  Third, it underestimates in its 
calculation the nonmaterial value of beliefs and ideas, which largely affect the behavior 
of political actors.  Lastly, agency theory lacks the ability to predict long-term trends in 
civil-military relations, since it only concentrates on specific factors and conditions 
leading to specific developments. 
F. LITERATURE REVIEW ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN CHINA 
As Ellis Joffe has observed, many China scholars have analyzed the relationship 
between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
through three approaches: 1) military professionalism; 2) party control of the military; 
and 3) symbiosis of the party and the military.40  Coinciding with these approaches are 
three models of civilian control cited by Fang Zhu that China analysts have applied in 
explaining civil-military relations in China: 1) the liberal model (based on 
professionalism); 2) the penetration model (based on party control); and 3) the symbiosis 
model.  In addition to these models of civilian control, Zhu has proposed an alternative 
model that undertakes a factional politics approach that he calls “civil-military 
dualism.”41 
1. Liberal Model 
The liberal model of civilian control is essentially based on Huntington’s 
professionalism thesis – that is, professionalism creates militaries that do not intervene in 
politics.  The liberal model asserts that military professionalism provides the basis for 
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liberal democracies of the West.  Thus, the liberal model observes the maximization of 
military professionalism as an ideal form of civilian control – also known as “objective 
control” in Huntington’s terms.42 
Although analysts have used this model for explaining civil-military relations in 
China,43 the liberal model is wholly inappropriate for the case of China.  Despite 
concerted efforts to professionalize its ranks, the PLA remains extensively involved in 
politics and continues its role as a pivotal player in the political arena.  Like most other 
militaries in communist political systems, the PLA is considered a normal participant in 
politics.44  In short, the liberal model fails to explain why the PLA remains politically 
involved even with efforts to professionalize the ranks. 
2. Penetration Model 
The penetration model examines the use of party control mechanisms, such as 
political indoctrination and party organizations within the military, to organizationally 
and ideologically penetrate the military to maintain civilian control.  In contrast to 
maximizing military professionalism, the penetration model depicts the maximization of 
civilian power at the expense of military professionalism as another ideal form of civilian 
control – also known as “subjective control,” using Huntington’s terminology.  Although 
the penetration model provides a better explanation for military obedience to party rule 
than the liberal model, it also cannot explain why the PLA continues to be extensively 
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involved in politics, since one would expect PLA military elites to simply adhere to the 
orders of civilian authorities and keep themselves out of the political arena.45 
Both the liberal and penetration models assume three things: 1) a clear divide 
between civilian and military institutions; 2) the existence of inter-institutional tensions 
due to a civil-military divide; and 3) the expectation that the military should keep out of 
politics.  This is clearly not the case in China.46 
3. Symbiosis Model 
In the symbiosis model, the party and the military are uniquely intertwined in a 
relationship in which the two institutions rely upon each other to maintain positions of 
power.  As a result of the CCP and the PLA simultaneously coming to power in 1949 and 
the CCP’s extensive penetration of Chinese society, there is cross-institutional 
penetration and low differentiation between civilian and military elites.  Both sides share 
a common interest in cooperating to preserve the party regime and to maintain what 
Monte Bullard has called an “interlocking directorate” at the highest levels whereby 
senior leaders hold concurrent positions in both civilian and military institutions. Thus, 
the symbiosis model represents a “party control model” rather than a “civilian control 
model.”47 
Compared to the liberal and penetration models, the symbiosis model is more 
effective in explaining the military’s extensive involvement in politics and its obedience 
to party rule.  But times have changed, as a growing divide has taken place between the 
current generation of civilian and military leaders and as revolutionary elites continue to 
fade from the political arena.  As professionalization of the PLA deepens and as post-
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revolutionary civilian leaders become more proficient in governance than in military 
affairs, the symbiosis model will increasingly lose substantial explanatory power. 
4. Civil-Military Dualism 
In contrast to the three models aforementioned, Fang Zhu proposes an alternative 
model – “civil-military dualism” - to examine the nature of civilian control of the military 
in China.  Civil-military dualism depicts the relationship between the CCP and the PLA 
as a “situation of partial integration, a two-sided process in which the political and 
military elites both intermingled [but] remained separate.” Unlike the symbiosis model, 
which suggests a cooperative relationship between civilian and military elites, the 
dualism model suggests that the relationship is marked by both “harmony and 
antagonism, cooperation and contention, interdependency and mutual suspicion.”  Thus, 
civil-military relations in China is dualistic in nature – on the one hand, the military 
identifies itself as an important part of the CCP with which it shares common interests; 
on the other hand, the PLA’s political participation has led to civil-military conflicts and 
intra-party factional disputes.48 
Of the four models previously discussed, the model of civil-military dualism 
offers the best approach to studying civil-military relations in China.  The study of civil-
military relations, however, encompasses many other facets of state, military, and society 
that need to be addressed, as previously discussed in this chapter.  The power and beliefs 
of civil society and international actors, the political structures that set constraints on the 
behavior of civilian and military elites, the use of the PLA’s coercive force in domestic 
and international governance, and the ability of the CCP government to address 
socioeconomic problems all have a collective impact on the nature of civil-military 
relations.  Unfortunately, the scope of the dualism model does not encompass this 
extensive range of issues in civil-military relations. 
G. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the explanations and theories of civil-military relations presented in this 
chapter advance numerous factors to explain a variety of developments in civil-military 
relations.  To explain why militaries intervene in politics, scholars have cited military 
                                                 




professionalism, military missions and roles, weakness of political institutions, and 
government performance as key factors.  On the instability of military regimes, problems 
of the military in sustaining political legitimacy and maintaining its authoritarian political 
system have been cited as principal causes.  The literature on civil-military relations in 
post-authoritarian states offers a variety of measures, such as military professionalization 
and promotion of democratic values, to keep the military out of politics.  Desch’s 
structural theory of civil-military relations argues that the structure of the internal and 
external threat environment of a particular nation-state determines pattern of civil-
military relations.  In contrast, Feaver’s rationalist theory argues that the pattern of civil-
military relations is determined by the calculative interactions between civilian and 
military elites at the agency level.  Within the literature of civil-military relations in 
China, four models of civilian control – liberal, penetration, symbiosis, and civil-military 
dualism - have been employed to explain developments in the CCP-PLA relationship. 
Although useful concepts can be drawn from this literature review, many of the 
explanations and theories of civil-military relations presented here are not effective in 
comprehensively explaining the wide array of developments in civil-military relations.  
As previously stated in Chapter I, this thesis suggests the use of an alternative analytical 
framework proposed by Multiah Alagappa for analyzing civil-military relations in China.  
It offers the most comprehensive explanatory framework to date.  It is structural in nature 
in that it takes into account the effects of domestic and international political structures.  
It is also addresses the agency level by focusing on the interactions between key civilian 
and military institutions and actors.  Moreover, the use of military force in governance, 
the power and beliefs of civil society and international actors, the legitimacy of political 




























III. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE POST-DENG ERA 
A. BACKGROUND 
The death of Deng Xiaoping in 1997 marked a dramatic turning point for civil-
military relations in China.  The post-Deng era has witnessed significant political and 
military developments impacting the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).  Along with the passing of Deng, these 
developments include two successions of post-revolutionary political leadership in the 
CCP, the increasing professionalization of the PLA officer corps, and the decline of 
communism.49 
The post-Deng era has already observed the ascension and resignation of Jiang 
Zemin (Deng’s successor) and the “Third Generation” political leadership - comprised of 
post-revolutionary civilian leaders who lacked military experience and few senior 
military officers who possessed extensive backgrounds in high-level politics.  Since 
2002, however, a sweeping turnover of top party, military, and state leadership positions 
has taken place in Chinese politics that began with the 16th CCP Congress in November 
2002, followed by the first annual session of the 10th National People’s Congress (NPC) 
in March 2003, then at the 16th Central Committee’s Fourth Plenum in September 2004, 
and finally completed at the third annual session of the 10th NPC in March 2005.50  The 
turnover marked the unprecedented orderly succession of the “Fourth Generation” 
political leadership – the succeeding generation of post-revolutionary civilian leaders 
possessing mostly technocratic backgrounds, yet also void of any military experience – 
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trifecta of leadership positions: General Secretary of the CCP, President of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 
both the CCP and the PRC state. 
Despite the intense political indoctrination and purges in the military ranks which 
stalled professionalization in the period after Tiananmen, the PLA has become an 
increasingly professionalized institution with a younger, well-educated, competent, and 
technologically-proficient officer corps.51  As You Ji has argued, the PLA has 
“transformed itself from a semirevolutionary, semiprofessional army into a true 
professional army,”52 although the PLA remains politicized to the extent that it continues 
to pledge absolute loyalty to the CCP (as opposed to the PRC state) and meddle in 
politics.  The PLA has also shifted its mission to focus almost exclusively on external 
defense rather than its previous mix of internal and external defense.  The last two 
decades have witnessed a drastic troop reduction in PLA personnel stressing quality over 
quantity.  Commercial enterprises of the PLA have reduced substantially as a result of 
Jiang’s order for military divestiture in 1998.  Moreover, communist ideology has lost 
substantial basis for control of the PLA in the post-Cold War era, as revolutionary zeal 
has been replaced by practical need for economic development, political stability, 
national security, and military modernization. 
This chapter first presents a background on PRC civil-military relations in the 
post-Deng era by exploring the following six events: 1) the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis; 
2) the 1998 PLA Divestiture of Commercial Enterprises; 3) the 2001 EP-3 Crisis; 4) the 
2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Crisis; 5) the 2003 Ming 361 
Submarine Accident; and 6) the 2003 Shenzhou-5 Manned Space Mission.  Next, it 
applies Multiah Alagappa’s investigative framework for examining civil-military changes 
and continuities in the post-Deng era to determine whether civilian supremacy or military 
domination characterizes the current nature of civil-military relations in China.  This 
                                                 
51 James C. Mulvenon, Professionalization of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps (Santa Monica, Calif.: 
RAND Corporation, 1997), ix-xv; and June Teufel Dreyer, “The New Officer Corps: Implications for the 
Future,” China Quarterly 146, Special Issue: China’s Military in Transition (June 1996): 315-35. 
52 You Ji, “China: From Revolutionary Tool to Professional Military,” in Military Professionalism in 





chapter then applies Alagappa’s explanatory framework to explain how the nature of 
civil-military relations in China has developed thus far.  This chapter concludes that the 
current trend in civil-military relations in China has been increasing civilian control of 
the PLA, as civilian leaders possess ultimate jurisdiction over political participation, 
socioeconomic activities, and illegal activities; command a larger share of jurisdictional 
power regarding the military’s institutional autonomy; and split ultimate decision-making 
authority with the PLA in security policymaking.  Moreover, China’s sustained high level 
of economic development and the increasing legitimacy of China’s political system have 
contributed to the reduction of the weight of coercion in governance in China and, by 
extension, the decrease of the political power and influence of the PLA over time. 
B. 1995-96 TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS 
In May 1995, Washington granted a visa to Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui to 
visit Cornell University (his alma meter) the following month.  During his visit to 
Cornell, Lee spoke highly of the accomplishments Taiwan had achieved thus far.  Beijing 
strongly opposed Lee’s visit because of suspicions that Lee was attempting to promulgate 
support for Taiwan independence, threatening the PRC’s foreign policy of eventual 
reunification with Taiwan.  PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen was given initial 
assurance from U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher that no visa would be granted, 
but the decision to grant Lee a visa was ultimately upheld and approved by the White 
House and U.S. Congress.  Indeed, Beijing was infuriated over Washington’s sudden 
reversal of policy.  In response, the PRC conducted a series of military exercises and 
missile tests in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait from July 1995 to March 1996 to deter 
Taiwan from pursuing independence, as well as to deter the United States from 
supporting Taiwan independence.53 
The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis not only marked the first crisis in the post-Deng 
era, but also signaled the eventual passing of the revolutionary generation of leaders and 
foreshadowed the gradual emergence of a division between the CCP and the PLA.  Deng 
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had played a key role in restraining PLA leaders from assertively voicing opinions in 
conflict with civilian leaders.  Although Deng was still alive during the crisis, he was too 
sick to participate in any decision-making.  With Deng essentially out of the picture, the 
PLA felt more inclined to assertively press for its own institutional interests and concerns 
regarding national security, such as pressuring civilian leaders led by Jiang Zemin for a 
hawkish, hard-line approach to resolve the Taiwan issue.  The PLA also centered its 
frustration on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) for failing to keep Washington from 
granting the visa in the first place.  Moreover, the PLA‘s eagerness to apply its new 
doctrine of “Limited War Under High-Tech Conditions” and to showcase itself as a 
symbol of Chinese nationalism may have prompted its promotion for a show of force 
response.  Thus, in the post-Deng era, the crisis showed initial signs of the PLA 
becoming more assertive as an institution with diverging interests from civilian 
leadership and more willing to voice its concerns to affect policy.54 
Although PLA leaders had pressed for a hawkish approach, the PLA was not the 
principal driver of Beijing’s decision to employ a show of force in the Taiwan Strait.  
Instead, the decision was largely the outcome of a civil-military consensus between the 
CCP and the PLA in which both sides actually shared the sentiment for a hard-line 
approach.  Moreover, as Andrew Scobell has argued, the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis 
stands “as a largely successful instance of coercive diplomacy by Beijing,” whereby 
Beijing had avoided a major conflict with both Taiwan and the United States while still 
moderating Taipei’s behavior by making Taipei fully aware of the dire consequences of 
any action that would antagonize Beijing (i.e., support for Taiwan independence).55 
C. 1998 PLA DIVESTITURE OF COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES 
On 22 July 1998, Jiang Zemin, flanked by senior PLA leaders observed to be 
lending tacit support, gave a speech at an enlarged session of the CMC that publicly 
called for the PLA to divest itself of its economic activities and dissolve its commercial 
enterprises, which had been substantial sources of extra-budgetary revenue for the PLA 
since 1985.  Later that night, Jiang’s speech was broadcast on PRC television to publicize 
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the official order and to show that the top military leadership had at least implicitly 
consented to Jiang’s decision.  The next day, key members of both civilian and military 
leaderships followed suit and lent their support of Jiang’s order for divestiture.56 
Interestingly, no major disputes arose within the top civilian and military 
leaderships; both agreed in principle to the divestiture for several reasons: 1) PLA 
commercial enterprises largely proved unprofitable and inefficient; 2) the divestiture 
focused on reducing rampant corruption in the PLA; and 3) PLA enterprises hindered 
military professionalization, as soldiers became more interested with profiting than with 
training.  The military’s compliance with the divestiture, however, was also contingent on 
the assurance from civilian leaders that the PLA would receive a generous compensation 
package in return for relinquishing its commercial enterprises.57 
Despite mutual consent, conflicts began to arise when divestiture entered into the 
year 1999.  As expected, some military units at the local level resisted divestiture and 
attempted to preserve control of PLA enterprises through a number of ways, such as 
transferring control of enterprises to relatives of military officers so as to retain unofficial 
business ties.  Moreover, the PLA’s compensation package for divesting its enterprises 
was far less than the PLA had expected.  The 1999 official military budget was meager in 
both relative and absolute terms - much to the chagrin of the PLA.  In relative terms, the 
12.7 percent increase was barely higher than the 12 percent increase in the 1998 official 
military budget.  In absolute terms, the increase of RMB13.65 billion from 1998 to 1999 
was slightly larger than the increase of RMB10.43 billion from 1997 to 1998.  Thus, only 
about RMB3 billion constituted the PLA’s compensation for giving up its business 
operations.  Furthermore, civilian leaders pursued intense disciplinary investigations to 
crack down on PLA corruption, upsetting officers who felt that these aggressive anti-
corruption measures were tarnishing the PLA’s public reputation.  Despite the severity of  
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these conflicts, the U.S. accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia in 
May 1999 precluded a serious civil-military debacle and secured a more generous long-
term budget for the PLA.58 
The 1998 divestiture of PLA commercial enterprises highlighted two important 
things.  First, the divestiture showed an apparently fracturing trust between civilian and 
military leaderships, as evidenced by the meager compensation for the PLA’s divestiture 
of its commercial enterprises and the aggressive anti-corruption measures launched by 
civilian leaders.  Second, the divestiture suggested that the respective interests of the 
civilian and military leaderships may perhaps be diverging and hence conflict with each 
other in the future.  Thus, the PLA would have reason to be more cautious in its approach 
to dealing with civilian leaders to satisfy its interests.  Likewise, civilian leaders would 
have to exercise prudence in their future interactions with the PLA.59 
D. 2001 EP-3 CRISIS 
On 1 April 2001, a collision occurred between a U.S. EP-3 spy plane and a 
Chinese F-8II fighter plane in the vicinity of Hainan Island of the PRC.  The EP-3 made 
an emergency landing onto Lingshui Airfield on Hainan Island after it collided with the 
Chinese F-8II, which was destroyed in the collision, killing its pilot.  The collision and 
subsequent detainment of all twenty-four U.S. crewmembers of the EP-3 by PRC 
officials sparked a tension-filled stand-off between the United States and China that 
lasted until 13 April 2001, when the crew was finally released.  While both the United 
States and China agreed that the EP-3 flew approximately 100 kilometers from Hainan 
Island as it was intercepted by two Chinese F-8II fighters, both sides maintained different 
accounts of what had happened from that point forward.  On the one hand, Chinese 
officials claimed the EP-3 “suddenly veered” and collided with the F-8II fighter piloted 
by Wang Wei, “ramming and destroying” the fighter and killing Wang.  On the other 
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hand, U.S. officials claimed that it was Wang Wei who carelessly flew too close to the 
EP-3 with a fighter plane susceptible to instability when flown at low speeds.60 
The 2003 EP-3 Crisis raised two issues for PRC civil-military relations.  First, 
critical facts concerning the collision and the EP-3 landing had almost certainly 
originated from PLA sources.  Hence, as James Mulvenon has argued, it is likely that the 
PLA may have used the EP-3 incident as an opportunity to influence PRC foreign policy 
and to make the military’s version of the EP-3 incident representative of the official 
position of the PRC government.  Moreover, the PLA may have used its monopolistic 
control over critical information flows to shape PRC foreign policy options by placing 
the United States primarily at fault for the collision between the EP-3 and the F-8II.  The 
reasons for this, as Mulvenon has suggested, may have been for the PLA to justify 
procurement of additional military resources to “push back” U.S. military presence in 
Asia and to remind the party leadership that the military dimension of U.S.-China 
relations deserves greater attention than accorded – in other words, the PLA’s 
institutional interests matter.  If the PLA did in fact misrepresent and exaggerate its 
account to benefit its own interests, there may possibly be long-term negative 
consequences for the relationship between the CCP and the PLA, as well as for the 
personnel choices civilian leaders will make concerning the appointments for the top 
senior military leadership.  Second, in the aftermath of the EP-3 Crisis, the PLA’s official 
statements and commentaries did not reflect the positive, conciliatory sentiments 
triumphed by official PRC media and diplomatic officials of the MFA when the crisis 
ended.  Such a divergence between civilian and military official statements may indicate 
the PLA’s displeasure with the civilian government’s resolution of the EP-3 crisis, as 
well as an increasingly tenuous relationship between the CCP and the PLA.61 
E. 2003 SARS CRISIS 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) first emerged within the elite PLA 
hospitals in Beijing around November 2002 - yet the PLA did not initially report SARS 
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cases to civilian government officials and even attempted to cover up the initial SARS 
outbreak, which was only later confirmed by reports from official Chinese media and 
Western media in March 2003 and of which the full extent was later revealed by a 
military doctor in Beijing around early April 2003.  The situation worsened as the 
Chinese Center for Disease Control (CDC) lacked the institutional channels to 
communicate with the PLA and lacked jurisdiction over military hospitals.  Moreover, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) was even kept out of inspecting PLA hospitals, 
which were moving SARS patients to different hospitals to prevent visiting WHO 
inspection teams from discovering them.  Because of the initial military cover-up, the 
horizontal separation between civilian and military bureaucracies, and the barrier placed 
against the WHO, SARS inevitably spread throughout China and developed into a serious 
epidemic resulting in more than 5,300 SARS cases with 349 deaths according to WHO 
statistics.  Despite its role in containing the spread of SARS and treating infected victims, 
the PLA continued to be less than cooperative when asked to share information regarding 
the number of SARS cases in its ranks.62 
The SARS crisis in general highlighted ongoing tensions in the relationship 
between the civilian government and the PLA.  In addition, the crisis brought much 
attention to the leadership struggle between Jiang Zemin, who was the CMC chairman at 
the time and yet remained silent on the epidemic for a prolonged period, and Hu Jintao, 
who took the opportunity to use his authority as the CMC vice chairman to appear 
constantly on PRC media and push for a policy of transparency regarding the official 
reporting of the SARS epidemic – a move that may be interpreted as Hu’s calculated 
attempt to consolidate his power.  The SARS crisis also featured the jockeying for 
leadership favor among civilian and military elites, whose public statements reflected 
apparent loyalty to Jiang, Hu, or both.63 
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F. 2003 MING 361 SUBMARINE ACCIDENT 
In late April or early May 2003, a PLA Navy Ming-class submarine (No. 361) 
suffered an onboard malfunction during a training exercise conducted in the Yellow Sea.  
For whatever reason, the malfunction not only crippled the submarine, but also suffocated 
all seventy crewmembers onboard.  Most of all, the accident illustrated the continuing 
leadership struggle between Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao – both of whom were again 
competing for influence among civilian and military elites by appearing frequently in the 
PRC media, sending condolences to family members of the departed crewmembers, 
personally inspecting the recovered vessel as members of the CMC, and even pushing for 
accountability and reform in the PLA.  Witnessing yet another opportunity to consolidate 
his power at the expense of Jiang, Hu used the Ming accident to advance calls for more 
strict accountability among military leaders (four senior navy leaders and eight personnel 
were eventually disciplined) and to open an investigation of the accident to acquire 
lessons learned.64 
G. 2003 SHENZHOU-5 MANNED SPACE MISSION 
On 15 October 2003, the PRC launched its first manned space mission, designated 
Shenzhou-5.  Yang Liwei, a lieutenant colonel in the PLA, orbited the Earth fourteen 
times over a twenty-one hour period, and subsequently landed safely in Inner Mongolia.  
Over the course of the Shenzhou-5 mission, however, Jiang Zemin was not in attendance 
at either the launch at the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center or at the observation of the 
space orbit from the Beijing Aerospace Command and Control Center.  Jiang’s absence 
during the Shenzhou-5 mission was especially noticeable, considering that he still 
retained chairmanship of the CMC at the time, was credited with the revival of the 
manned spaceflight program in 1992, and was involved in the past four Shenzhou 
launches.   In contrast, Hu Jintao played a significant role in the Shenzhou-5 mission, 
presiding over the pre-launch ceremony, witnessing the launch itself, and issuing an 
“important speech” on the success of China’s first manned space mission.  PRC Premier 
Wen Jiabao (Hu’s right-hand man) also played a significant role in welcoming back Yang 
after landing in Inner Mongolia.  Moreover, official PRC media had made sparse mention 
                                                 




of Jiang in the aftermath of the launch, focusing mainly on the actions of Hu.  Taking all 
of this into account, along with the SARS crisis and the Ming 361 submarine accident 
earlier that year, Jiang’s absence from the Shenzhou-5 mission launch likely indicated the 
increasing consolidation of Hu’s power within civilian and military leadership circles at 
the expense of Jiang.65  This was made much more apparent by Jiang’s formal 
resignation from the chairmanships of both the Party CMC and State CMC during the 
16th Central Committee’s Fourth Plenum in September 2004 and the third annual session 
of the 10th NPC in March 2005, respectively.66 
H. ANALYSIS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE POST-DENG 
ERA 
1. Investigative Framework 
Does civilian supremacy characterize the current nature of civil-military relations 
in China - or does the military dominate politics?  Answering this requires applying 
Multiah Alagappa’s investigative framework for examining civil-military changes and 
continuities in the post-Deng era.  In particular, ultimate decision-making authority 
(jurisdiction) and the extent of military participation (scope) must be explored in each of 
the following five areas of governance: political participation, institutional autonomy, 
security policymaking, socioeconomic activities, and illegal activities. 
a. Political Participation 
Political participation of the PLA is not an exceptional phenomenon in 
China - given the nature of its communist political system in which the military is 
considered a “normal participant in politics” and exists exclusively to uphold communist 
party rule.67  The PLA’s participation in politics can be attributed to four things: 1) 
political participation as a tool for advancing the PLA’s institutional interests; 2) the 
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PLA’s historical tradition of political participation; 3) the PLA’s political role as an 
arbiter between civilian political groups; and 4) the CCP’s command of the PLA to 
protect its single party rule, especially in times of a political crisis (e.g. Tiananmen 
Square).  Moreover, the PLA’s support for policies set by the CCP is highly valued, 
highlighting the importance of the military’s influence in the political arena.68  Thus, the 
PLA plays a key role in maintaining the political power and stability of the CCP 
government. 
During the eras of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, the PLA was 
subordinated under an authoritarian political system dominated by powerful civilian 
leaders with revolutionary military backgrounds (which accorded them a high level of 
credibility and legitimacy in the view of the PLA) and strong personal connections with 
the senior military leadership.  Significant developments in the post-Deng era, however, 
have limited the degree to which the PLA participates in the political arena. 
According to James Mulvenon, two significant trends have reduced the 
extent to which the military can participate and influence politics: 1) the post-
revolutionary generational shifts in both the civilian and military leaderships, which have 
differentiated the military from the party; and 2) the professionalization of the PLA 
officer corps.  The generational shifts have been especially important because the post-
revolutionary political leadership is largely composed of civilian elites who specialize in 
bureaucratic management and possess technical backgrounds, but share little or no 
personal connections with military elites because their lack of military experience.  Thus, 
post-revolutionary civilian leaders, such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, have not been 
privileged to the type of intimate relationship with the PLA that Mao and Deng 
possessed.  The informal channels of influence and personal connections that once 
accorded the paramount leader unparalleled military control are apparently non-existent 
with post-Deng civilian leaders, who must cater to the PLA’s institutional interests to 
build political support.69 
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In contrast, ongoing efforts to establish professional norms in the PLA, 
along with the passing of revolutionary military leaders who possessed extensive political 
ties and the rise of civilian technocratic elites, suggest that post-revolutionary military 
leaders are less able to exploit informal channels of influence, and therefore must 
increasingly rely on formal institutional channels and bureaucratic lobbying to voice their 
concerns and interests to civilian leadership.  Moreover, the lack of a military 
representative in the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) implies that the PLA cannot 
directly articulate or influence policy preferences within the highest authoritative body of 
the CCP.  In addition, the PLA has been mostly concerned with institutional interests and 
defense related affairs, and therefore has largely stayed out of non-defense related affairs, 
such as China’s market-oriented economy – an increasingly complex structure in which 
the PLA is far less apt to manage than civilian bureaucrats.  Furthermore, although it is 
unclear as to the extent of the role in which the PLA plays in the selection of civilian 
political leadership, the emergence of a post-revolutionary generation of civilian and 
military leaders that is more separate than unified suggests that the PLA does not possess 
vast political leverage in the post-Deng era to independently force the selection or 
rejection of any particular civilian political leader.70 
While the PLA remains a significant force in Chinese politics, the scope of 
the PLA’s political participation has significantly declined and its jurisdiction in political 
participation has been largely limited to the realm of military-related issues.  Thus, this 
suggests that civilian leaders possess ultimate jurisdiction over the broader political 
landscape in China. 
b. Institutional Autonomy 
James Mulvenon has aptly described the current arrangement of civil-
military relations in China as one of “conditional compliance.”  In this arrangement, 
civilian leaders cater to the PLA’s institutional interests (e.g. defense budgets and 
resource procurements) as much as possible and yield to the PLA some measure of 
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institutional autonomy, whereby civilian leaders permit the PLA to autonomously 
organize and manage carefully delineated areas, such as defense policy, military 
modernization, recruitment criteria, and promotions of personnel below the ranks of the 
top senior military leadership.  In return for gaining a limited degree of institutional 
autonomy, the PLA refrains from involvement in non-defense related areas (such as 
China’s economy), focuses largely on military professionalization, and, more 
importantly, concedes itself to unquestioned civilian control.  In contrast, civilian leaders 
enforce civilian control of the military through the Central Military Commission (CMC), 
a highly-centralized command and control system, the political work system, established 
roles and missions for the PLA, appointments and rotations of high-level military 
personnel, defense budgets, and the military legal system.71 
The CCP exercises civilian control through two key governing 
institutions: the Party Central Military Commission and the State Central Military 
Commission.  In theory, these are two separate institutions serving the party and the state, 
respectively.  In practice, however, the memberships in these two organizations are 
virtually identical.  In fact, these two organizations are often simply referred to as a single 
institution - the Central Military Commission (CMC) - without reference to either the 
party or the state.  The highest authoritative figure in the CMC is the Chairman – a 
position held exclusively by the civilian paramount leader of the CCP.72 
To maintain strict operational control over PLA units, civilian leaders 
employ a highly-centralized command and control system, with the paramount leader 
commanding the highest authority.  Thus, CCP leaders with proper authority can 
mobilize PLA units by issuing orders down through their chain of command or directly to 
selected units.  PLA commanders, on the other hand, can only mobilize small units 
without prior approval from Beijing.  To maintain the PLA’s party allegiance, civilian 
leaders employ the political work system, which consists of three separate control 
mechanisms to ensure military obedience: 1) the political commissar system; 2) the party 
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committee system; and 3) the discipline inspection system.  Although political work 
today barely focuses on promoting communist ideology, civilian leaders continue to use 
the political work system to inculcate loyalty in the PLA to support the “absolute 
leadership of the party.”73 
Under the command of the CCP government, the PLA performs four 
essential missions: 1) maintain the CCP government in power; 2) provide national 
defense against external threats and protect the territorial sovereignty of China; 3) 
maintain internal security (although the People’s Armed Police (PAP) acts as the first line 
of internal defense, the PLA still bears overall responsibility); and 4) engage in non-
military activities (such as disaster relief projects) at the behest of the CCP government.74 
In terms of personnel appointments, the civilian paramount leader, by 
virtue of his position as CMC Chairman, is responsible for directly selecting and 
promoting the top senior military leadership in the PLA, which include military members 
in the CMC and military regional commanders, to ensure the loyalty of those in charge at 
the top of the PLA.  Additionally, to prevent the rise of regional centers of power, or what 
Mao Zedong referred to as “independent kingdoms,” military regional commanders and 
other high-level PLA officers are required to periodically rotate from their positions after 
a set number of years, thus assuring civilian leaders that no military region or command 
becomes the domain of a warlord that would pose a direct challenge to Beijing.75 
Civilian leaders maintain control over the PLA’s defense budget and 
procurements through the exercise of state legislative power via the National People’s 
Congress (NPC), which, according to Article 57 of the PRC Constitution, must officially 
approve the defense budget as it does with the national budget.  Moreover, the defense 
budget process adopts a “down-up-down” system - whereby the CMC, the Ministry of 
Finance (part of the PRC state), and other related agencies collaborate to decide on the 
total expenditure targets for the fiscal year, subsequently gather estimated funding 
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requests from all military regions and districts, and then ultimately establish the final 
expenditure figures and the defense budget.76 
Since 1978, the PLA’s military legal system has increasingly consolidated 
under civilian control.  According to the PRC Constitution, military courts are placed 
under the ultimate authority of the Supreme People’s Court (part of the PRC state) and 
are equivalent to the people’s courts that regulate civil society in China.  In the past two 
decades, a considerable number of laws and regulations have been passed by the NPC, 
CMC, and the State Council underscoring the legal administration, regulation, and 
conduct of the military under civilian government control.  More recently, the military’s 
roles and functions have also been explicitly codified in an increasing number of laws, 
documents, and regulations.  One of the most important laws passed has been the 1997 
National Defense Law, which officially subordinates the military under state control, 
increases the NPC’s responsibilities and oversight functions over the military, and 
stresses military organization, administration, and mobilization according to laws and 
regulations.77 
In short, there is mixed jurisdiction between civilian and military 
leaderships with regards to the PLA’s institutional autonomy, since civilian leaders cede 
some measure of institutional autonomy to the PLA to gain military compliance to 
civilian control.  Nevertheless, civilian leaders command a much larger share of 
jurisdictional power, as they ultimately decide personnel appointments and rotations of 
the top senior military leadership, determine the roles and missions of the PLA, establish 
defense budgets for the military, maintain centralized command and control, and set the 
rules for how the PLA lawfully functions in service to the party and the PRC. 
c. Security Policymaking 
Michael Swaine depicts China’s national security policy arena as 
composed of four subarenas: 1) national strategic objectives; 2) foreign policy; 3) defense 
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policy; and 4) strategic research, analysis, and intelligence (SRAI).  As Swaine has noted, 
“military involvement is evident in all four security policy subarenas, albeit to widely 
varying degrees, ranging from near total control over defense policy to limited but 
significant influence over foreign policy.”78  Thus overall, the PLA plays a significant 
role in shaping national security policies, but is by no means the dominant participant. 
The national strategic objectives subarena deals with the establishment of 
broad strategic principles, concepts, and goals that guide China’s entire national security 
policy arena.  Because of its significance to the other subarenas of national security 
policy, the national strategic objectives subarena is largely composed of the top 
individuals who hold supreme control over the party, state, and military apparatuses.  
Interestingly, ultimate decision-making authority over national security objectives rests 
not with the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) as a body, but with an informal 
national security directorate, which consists of the most senior civilian and military 
leaders involved in national security affairs.79 
In the Deng era, a select group of top senior PLA leaders likely performed 
important roles for Deng Xiaoping as personal policy advisors and consultants in shaping 
the formulation and implementation of national security objectives, often on a very 
informal basis and often with more clout than their civilian counterparts.  In the post-
Deng era, however, the absence of a paramount leader with the authority of Deng has 
fashioned a collective leadership system that necessitates more collaborative, 
coordinated, and institutionalized interactions between civilian and military leaders in 
formulating and implementing national strategic objectives, thus diffusing ultimate 
decision-making authority in this subarena among civilian and military leaders.  Although 
the degree to which the PLA and its leaders influence the formulation and 
implementation of China’s national strategic objectives is difficult to determine, the 
central importance of national strategic objectives to military strategy highly suggests 
that military leaders exercise significant participation and exert extensive influence in this  
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subarena.  In any case, senior military leaders remain invaluable to civilian leaders as 
policy advisors and consultants with respect to formulating and implementing national 
security objectives.80 
The foreign policy subarena deals with the entire spectrum of external 
policies and activities related to foreign affairs and diplomatic relations between China 
and other nation-states in support of Chinese national security policy.  Accordingly, this 
subarena primarily falls under the responsibility of civilian agencies belonging to the 
PRC State Council and the CCP.  Such agencies include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation, and the CCP International Liaison Department.  In theory, 
ultimate decision-making authority over foreign policy formally rests with the PBSC as a 
body.  In practice, however, most foreign policy initiatives are either directly undertaken 
by the MFA or recommended by the MFA and/or the Foreign Affairs Leading Small 
Group (FALSG – the key group of party leaders responsible for foreign affairs) and then 
formally approved by the PBSC, often without much deliberation.81 
While high-level civilian party and state organs directly manage Chinese 
foreign policy, the PLA does not play a central role in the foreign policy subarena.  
Although the PLA does not directly manage problems in international security, it 
nevertheless actively participates and seeks to influence in at least seven critical areas of 
Chinese foreign policy: China-Taiwan relations, Sino-U.S. relations, Sino-Japanese 
relations, Sino-Russian relations, South Asia issues, South China Sea issues, and arms 
control.  Because it is primarily responsible for providing national defense and protecting 
territorial sovereignty of China, the PLA thus believes it must have a voice in matters 
concerning major international security issues - especially with regards to Taiwan, Japan, 
and the United States.82 
Despite the lack of formal channels of influence into the foreign policy 
subarena, there are two important interagency forums where the PLA can officially voice 
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its foreign policy preferences and concerns: the FALSG and the Taiwan Affairs Leading 
Small Group (TALSG).  Even with the PLA’s lack of direct involvement in the foreign 
policy subarena, PLA influence on matters of foreign policy will depend upon the success 
or failure of civilian leaders and agencies in resolving foreign policy issues (especially 
Taiwan and, by extension, the United States), thus having major implications for the 
relationship between the CCP and the PLA.  The absence of a paramount leader with the 
arbitrating power of Deng Xiaoping, coupled with the military’s increasing interests to 
play up the significance of major security issues to advance its institutional interests, 
suggests that the PLA will likely attempt to increase its influence on Chinese foreign 
policymaking in the future.83 
The defense policy subarena focuses on the broad range of policies and 
activities that deal with external defense and security in support of China’s national 
security policies and objectives.  Key elements dealt with in this subarena include 
military doctrine, military strategy, military tactics, military budgets, force 
modernization, force structure, force deployments, force readiness and training, military-
related acquisitions, and arms control.  Hence, the defense policy subarena primarily 
centers on developing China’s national military strategy, as well as coordinating and 
executing military assessments, planning, and implementation.  Just as the foreign policy 
subarena is primarily the domain of civilian party and state agencies under the State 
Council and the CCP, major military agencies of the PLA virtually dominate the defense 
policy subarena.  Thus, the PLA is primarily responsible for formulating and 
implementing national defense policies for China, although it does so under the 
supervision of the informal national security directorate responsible for formulating 
national strategic objectives.  Overall, the defense policy subarena constitutes the 
foundation for the PLA’s involvement in national security policymaking arena.84 
Principal actors in the defense policy subarena include the highest-ranking 
civilian party leader, senior military officers with high party rank, and the executive 
heads of the major PLA military departments, services, and organizations (of which the 
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most influential and outspoken agencies in formulating and implementing defense policy 
are the General Staff Department (GSD), the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force 
(PLAAF), and the Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National 
Defense (COSTIND)).85 
The top tier of principal actors in this subarena encompasses the most 
senior members in the CMC - namely, the CMC chairman (who is also the civilian 
paramount leader) and the CMC vice chairmen.  These individuals together form an 
informal CMC executive committee, which exercises ultimate decision-making authority 
concerning national defense policies, often with the formal approval of members of the 
PBSC.  The most critical and influential decision-makers are almost certainly the CMC 
vice chairmen who also double as high-ranking PLA generals – as senior PLA leaders, 
they are the most qualified and well-experienced to administer military and defense-
related affairs at the national level.86  In the post-Deng era, the civilian paramount leader 
(i.e., Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao), undoubtedly lacking military experience, virtually 
follows the lead of the top PLA leadership with regards to defense policymaking, and 
thus plays the role of official communicator and policy advocate of the PLA’s views on 
national defense policies.87 
The strategic research, analysis, and intelligence (SRAI) subarena 
encompasses the full spectrum of specialist research, expert analyses, policy 
recommendations, and intelligence collection practices used to support the decision-
making processes and guide the activities of policymakers and agencies within the other 
subarenas of national strategic objectives, foreign policy, and defense policy.  This 
subarena comprises of an extensive range of both civilian and military institutions, 
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departments, and organizations - collectively referred to by David Shambaugh as China’s 
“national security research bureaucracy”88 - whereby each agency conducts research, 
analyzes information, produces policy recommendations, and/or gathers intelligence on a 
vast array of subjects that are of critical interest to national security policymakers.  Such 
subjects include international relations; regional and country studies; strategic and 
security studies; political, economic, social, and military developments in the global or 
regional context; and foreign military capabilities, doctrines, strategies, and tactics.89 
Within the SRAI subarena, both civilian and military agencies jointly 
operate to support the other subarenas.  The most significant civilian agencies are those 
attached to the MSS, MFA, and the Xinhua News Agency.  Other less significant civilian 
agencies are attached to the State Council, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(CASS), and various major universities.  These civilian agencies, however, pale in 
comparison to their military counterparts.  Indeed, military agencies are the major actors 
within the SRAI subarena, producing the most significant strategic research, analysis, and 
intelligence products that substantially influence the entire national security policy arena.  
Key military agencies are those attached to the Ministry of National Defense (MND), 
COSTIND, and the GSD’s Operations Department.  The Second (Intelligence), Third 
(Signals Intelligence), and Fourth (Electronic Warfare) Sub-Departments of the GSD’s 
Operations Department are the premier military agencies of the SRAI subarena.  Of 
these, the Second Sub-Department is the most superior source for national-level 
intelligence and military-related strategic analysis for senior leadership.  Intelligence 
reports analyzing China’s external threat environment (which include foreign military 
capabilities and U.S. military presence in Asia), for instance, are often generated by 
military strategists from the Second Sub-Department.  Thus, in the SRAI subarena, 
military agencies providing strategic research, analysis, and intelligence play a significant 
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role in shaping national strategic objectives, foreign policy, and defense policy – much 
more so than their civilian counterparts.90 
Overall, the cumulative effect of military involvement in the entire 
national security policy arena is “more indirect than direct,” whereby the PLA plays a 
critical role in shaping national strategic objectives, foreign policy, and defense policy, as 
well as providing the strategic research, analysis, and intelligence that serve as the 
principal source for civilian leadership in determining China’s security situation.91  In the 
eras of Mao and Deng, personal interactions and informal advice from individual military 
leaders and elders were the primary sources for the paramount leader in determining 
national security policies for China.  In the post-Deng era, however, the process of 
formulating and implementing national security policies has become much more 
bureaucratic and institutionalized in nature.  Moreover, ultimate decision-making 
authority and leadership over the entire national security policy arena has become much 
more diffuse, especially in the absence of a paramount leader that wields unquestionable 
power and personal control of the military.92 
Although ultimate jurisdiction is diffused among civilian and military 
leaders in the post-Deng era, the PLA nevertheless commands significant influence on 
national security policymaking, as the PLA possesses the principal sources for defining 
China’s national security threat environment, virtually dominates the defense policy 
subarena, seeks to influence foreign policymaking, and actively participates as policy 
advisors and consultants to civilian leadership in formulating and implementing national 
strategic objectives. 
d. Socioeconomic Activities 
Military involvement in socioeconomic activities in China traces back 
nearly 2000 years to the early dynastic period.  Traditional military forces in China were 
expected to be partially, if not fully, self-sustaining in producing food and supplies with 
their own farms and enterprises to alleviate dynastic governments from bearing the full 
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and costly burden of maintaining standing armies.  The PLA continued this tradition of 
military self-sufficiency when it first began developing farms and enterprises in 1928 
virtually out of necessity, since the PLA needed its own means of production to supply 
not only itself, but also the local peasantry so as to develop a strong political and 
economic relationship with them and to ultimately enlist their support for the communist 
movement.  Military self-sufficiency also helped the PLA avoid becoming vulnerable and 
dependent on goods and services from external sources that would have been cut off by 
Nationalist forces.  Mao and other CCP leaders were especially pleased with the PLA’s 
self-sufficient productivity, since it provided for much of the PLA’s own needs, helped 
improve relations between the PLA and “the masses,” and helped consolidate the CCP’s 
political power throughout China in the initial years after the PRC was established in 
1949.  Thus throughout the Mao era, PLA enterprises, mostly regarded as legitimate by 
both civilian and military leaders, grew in number, output, and diversity - although most 
military enterprises were generating agricultural and industrial goods exclusively for 
military use.93 
In the early years of the reform era, civilian leaders led by Deng Xiaoping 
decided to shift governmental resources from the defense sector to other state industrial 
sectors in order to spur rapid economic development and modernization as China’s 
economy began to marketize and integrate with the global market.  Consequently, the 
PLA’s share of the national budget reduced from 17.5 percent in 1979 down to 10.4 
percent in 1985.  Moreover, the CCP government announced in 1985 that the PLA would 
have to reduce the size of its military ranks by demobilizing nearly one million personnel.  
Even with this drastic reduction in the size of its total labor force, the PLA still had 
trouble providing basic necessities for its military personnel.  As their standards of living 
dropped exceedingly low, PLA troops often became poor, dependent on the welfare of 
others, and suffered from low morale.  Thus, in response to limited state funding of the 
defense sector, the CCP decided in 1985 to allow the PLA to commercialize and expand 
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its military enterprises into the civilian market to compensate for decreased defense 
spending and to further promote military self-sufficiency.94 
With the added incentive of special privileges granted by the CCP 
government, the number of PLA commercial enterprises grew dramatically, as there may 
have been as many as 20,000 PLA-owned enterprises during the late 1980s and early 
1990s.  Through the past two decades, however, the PLA’s commercial enterprises 
became severe liabilities for both the CCP and the PLA for several reasons.  First, most 
PLA enterprises proved unprofitable due to their excessive debts, resource unavailability, 
and poorly trained administrators and workers.  Second, PLA commercial enterprises 
became political liabilities as they were increasingly associated with corruption.  Most 
citizens believed military enterprises competed unfairly with their civilian counterparts, 
as military enterprises had privileged access to the government’s natural resources, 
railroads, and industries.  In fact, many PLA enterprises actively engaged in smuggling 
and other illegal activities for additional profit, further tarnishing the PLA’s public 
reputation.  Lastly, PLA enterprises severely hampered military professionalization, 
discipline, and unity across the ranks.  Initial efforts by the CCP government to curtail 
PLA corruption largely focused on reforming PLA commercial enterprises rather than 
eliminating them, as well as developing a legal framework that would effectively regulate 
military-business operations.  Both attempts at curbing military corruption, however, 
failed.  It essentially took the discovery of rampant oil smuggling operations conducted 
by several PLA commercial enterprises that resulted in a huge loss of government 
revenues to compel CCP leaders to call for the divestiture of PLA commercial 
enterprises.95 
On 22 July 1998, Jiang Zemin officially announced that the PLA would 
have to divest itself of its business activities and dissolve its commercial enterprises by 
the end of the year.  Only commercial enterprises, such as hotels, telecommunications, 
and anything else dealing with commerce, were affected by the divestiture.  Hence, farms 
and production facilities remained intact, as they were critical in providing immediate 
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necessities and maintaining the standard of living of PLA soldiers.  Despite some 
resistance and resentment by some military personnel, the PLA nevertheless largely 
complied with Jiang’s divestiture order and even lent its support to a top-level, civilian 
leading group led by Hu Jintao to oversee the entire divestiture process.96 
To the extent that divestiture has significantly reduced the PLA’s source 
of extra-budgetary revenue and has thus made the PLA more dependent on state 
budgetary allocations, the nature of the PLA’s compliance to the 1998 divestiture of its 
commercial enterprises apparently suggests that civilian leaders have ultimate jurisdiction 
over the military’s socioeconomic activities. 
e. Illegal Activities 
In the Mao era, military corruption was largely limited to nepotism, 
patronage, and minor forms of bribery (minus cash) at the individual level.  Because of 
the high-level status accorded to PLA officers at the time, corrupt officials often used 
their personal connections (or guanxi) to gain admission for their children into military 
service.  “Back door” promotions of officers based on close relationships with senior 
military leaders and facilitated employment for relatives of military personnel were also 
common practices of military corruption.  Hence, military corruption in the Mao era was 
narrow in scope and scale, since PLA enterprises were largely focused on producing 
goods and services exclusively for military consumption and were severely limited in 
economic opportunities for personal and monetary gains under the rule of Mao.97 
In the reform era, however, the scope and scale of military corruption 
grew dramatically as China opened up its economy to the rest of the world.  The 
integration of China’s economy into the global market launched greater financial 
opportunities and incentives for military corruption to operate on a much larger scale and 
to participate across a broader scope of commercial activities.  Hence, military corruption 
in China became driven not by personal favors as it was in the Mao era, but by monetary 
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gain.  Moreover, commercialization of PLA enterprises in 1985 further exacerbated 
military corruption in the ranks.  Indeed, numerous military personnel exploited the new 
found economic opportunities and often colluded with civilian counterparts in a wide 
range of illegal activities for personal gain.98 
In the 1990s, Jiang Zemin, with the assistance of senior military 
leadership, conducted a series of intense anti-corruption campaigns in an attempt to 
stamp out military corruption rooted in the PLA’s participation in economic activities.  In 
his speeches, Jiang heavily criticized the rise of corruption in the military ranks, calling 
on the PLA to be “ahead of the nation” and to adhere to the “three virtues” of patriotism, 
socialism, and collectivism while rejecting the “three evils” of money worship, hedonism, 
and individualism.  In addition, Jiang further declared that the “fight against corruption is 
a grave political struggle vital to the very existence of the party and the state” and that 
“the nature, true color, and work style of the people’s army” needed to be preserved.  
Other PLA leaders, such as Generals Zhang Wannian and Wang Ke, also reflected 
Jiang’s sentiments and themes of anti-corruption, arguing for stronger measures and 
stricter punishments to stamp out military corruption that was becoming detrimental to 
the discipline and unity of the PLA.99 
With the PLA’s commercial enterprises identified as the primary source of 
the military’s economic crimes, curtailment of military corruption made substantial 
progress with the divestiture order in 1998, when Jiang Zemin, with apparent support 
from senior military leaders, publicly announced on 22 July 1998 in a televised speech 
calling for the PLA to divest itself of its economic activities and to dissolve its 
commercial enterprises.  Despite resistance from a number of PLA units, the PLA 
complied with the execution of its orders to divest its commercial enterprises - in total, 
2,937 firms owned by the PLA as well as the People’s Armed Police (PAP) were 
transferred to local government control and 3,928 businesses were closed.100  Moreover, 
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in 1999, as the divestiture process was underway, Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji 
ordered civilian special investigative teams to conduct a full audit of the PLA’s finances, 
probe the financial accounts of PLA enterprises in domestic and foreign banks, and 
pursue discipline investigations against corrupt PLA officers (many of whom were senior 
military leaders).101 
Despite lingering resentment among some military personnel for 
relinquishing such a major source of extra-budgetary revenue, the future trajectory of 
military corruption in the PLA apparently favors a positive direction, as a substantial 
number of PLA commercial enterprises have been shut down or transferred to state 
control as per the orders of the civilian leadership. Civilian leaders, however, have been 
cautious not to raise the ire of the PLA with public indictments of military personnel; 
instead, they have focused on publicly prosecuting party, government, and police officials 
for acts of corruption, despite evidence of PLA involvement.102 
Nevertheless, civilian leaders command ultimate jurisdiction over the 
military’s involvement in illegal activities - as demonstrated by the 1998 divestiture of 
PLA commercial enterprises, intense anti-corruption campaigns led by civilian 
leadership, special investigations of PLA finances and accounts, and discipline 
investigations conducted by civilian investigators outside military jurisdiction. 
f. Civilian Supremacy or Military Domination? 
Upon examining each of the five areas of governance assessed using 
Alagappa’s investigative framework, the scope of the PLA participation is significantly 
evident in political participation, institutional autonomy, security policymaking, 
socioeconomic activities, and illegal activities - although the scope in political 
participation, socioeconomic activities, and illegal activities has been significantly 
declining in recent times.  Although the PLA participates extensively in each of the five 
areas of governance, the military does not dominate any one particular area.  The scope 
of the PLA’s political participation has significantly declined and its jurisdiction in this 
area has been largely limited to defense-related affairs.  Despite mixed jurisdiction with 
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regards to the military’s institutional autonomy, civilian leaders nevertheless command a 
much larger share of jurisdictional power even while ceding some measure of 
institutional autonomy to the PLA.  In area of security policymaking, ultimate jurisdiction 
has been diffused among civilian and military leaders in the post-Deng era, even though 
the PLA commands significant influence on national security policymaking.  Civilian 
leaders have ultimate jurisdiction over the military’s socioeconomic and illegal activities- 
as suggested by the 1998 divestiture of PLA commercial enterprises, intense anti-
corruption campaigns imposed on the military, special investigations probing PLA 
finances and accounts, and discipline investigations of corrupt PLA officers.  Thus, 
civilian leaders possess ultimate jurisdiction over political participation, socioeconomic 
activities, and illegal activities; command a larger share of jurisdictional power regarding 
the military’s institutional autonomy; and split ultimate decision-making authority with 
the PLA in security policymaking.  In short, the balance of civil-military relations leans 
toward increasing civilian supremacy – the current trend which characterizes the nature 
of the relationship between the CCP and the PLA in the post-Deng era. 
2. Explanatory Framework 
Employing Alagappa’s investigative framework to examine civil-military changes 
and continuities in China asserts that the balance of PRC civil-military relations in the 
post-Deng era leans toward civilian supremacy.  But how does one explain how and why 
civilian leaders continue to exercise control of the PLA?  To answer this requires the 
application of Alagappa’s explanatory framework to explain civil-military changes and 
continuities.  As previously stated in Chapter I, Alagappa’s explanatory framework 
explains the nature of civil-military relations as the outcome of two sets of processes: 1) 
the structural-level interplay between the weight of coercion in governance, the level of 
economic development, and the legitimacy of the political system; 2) the agency-level 
interplay between the interests, power, and beliefs of key civilian and military institutions 
and actors involved, as well as those of civil society and international actors. 
a. Interplay of Coercion, Economic Development, and Political 
Legitimacy 
Utilizing Alagappa’s explanatory framework, consolidation of civilian 




coercive state institutions to govern China and the associated reduction of the political 
power and influence of the military relative to non-coercive state institutions.  To explain 
both the decreasing weight of coercion in governance and the decreasing political power 
and influence of the PLA at the structural level requires examining the overall collective 
effect of two structural factors: 1) the sustained level of China’s economic development; 
and 2) the increasing legitimacy of China’s political system. 
China has remarkably sustained a high level of economic development 
since 1978, when Deng Xiaoping launched sweeping economic reforms that drew China 
out of its autarkic state and opened up its economy to participation in the global market.  
During the Deng era from 1978-1995, as a result of economic policies which significantly 
decentralized decision-making throughout China’s economy and called for state 
withdrawal from a number of sectors to liberate market forces, the average annual growth 
rate for China’s gross domestic product (GDP) was 9.8 percent, or approximately 1.5 
times the average annual GDP growth rate under Mao (6.7 percent), despite economic 
retrenchment policies instituted between 1989-1991 in the wake of Tiananmen Square 
which dropped annual GDP growth rates to a range between 4-6 percent.  In addition, 
capital investments into China’s economy grew increasingly efficient as a result of 
China’s growing participation in the global market.  More importantly, per capita 
household consumption increased dramatically during the Deng era, indicative of the 
overall improvement in the quality of life in China.  By the end of 1995, China had vastly 
improved its overall economic structure to become the world’s seventh largest participant 
in the global economy.103 
Various far-reaching measures were implemented during the Deng era that 
improved the agricultural, industrial, monetary, and fiscal sectors that suffered greatly 
under Mao’s economic policy regime.  Inadequate outputs of the agriculture sector were 
alleviated by such measures as easing the restrictions on the types of crops that could be 
grown, reinstituting a rural market economy for farm outputs, and, most importantly, 
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abandoning the commune system and restoring household farming.  In the industrial 
sector, markets replaced centrally-planned allocations of most industrial goods and state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) were forced to compete in the market economy with domestic 
and foreign private enterprises - both of which were now permitted under Deng’s 
economic policies.  In the monetary sector, while the state remained largely responsible 
for investments in critical infrastructure and other key areas of nation-building, most 
investment activities were removed from the state budget and became financed by private 
funds, bank loans, and foreign investments. Moreover, commercial banks became 
widespread, with the People’s Bank of China – acting as the central bank - tasked to 
regulate China’s money supply in a similar fashion as the Federal Reserve System does in 
the United States.  In the fiscal sector, to preserve the CCP government’s revenue base 
while ensuring provinces obtain a reasonable share of revenue as well, separate 
regularized tax systems at the national and local levels were established in 1994.104 
Deng’s economic reforms significantly opened up China to foreign trade 
and foreign direct investments (FDI), which not only stimulated rapid economic growth, 
but also provided China with a critical opportunity to catch up with the global 
technological developments that it had isolated itself from during its era of self-reliance.  
In terms of foreign aid and assistance, China’s membership in the international financial 
regimes of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asian 
Development Bank beginning in 1981 helped further advance China’s economic 
development through the substantial use of development loans and credit.105 
The sustained high level of economic development has continued on 
through the post-Deng era, as annual GDP growth rates for China from 1995-2004 
measured between 7.1-10.5 percent (10.5% in 1995, 9.6% in 1996, 8.8% in 1997, 7.8% in 
1998, 7.1% in 1999, 8.0% in 2000, 7.5% in 2001, 8.0% in 2002, 9.1% in 2003, and 9.5% 
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in 2004).106  With China’s accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
December 2001, China’s domestic market has become increasingly open to foreign goods 
and services, and foreigners may now establish their own enterprises in many sectors of 
China’s economy, with more opportunities for trade expansion expected in the future.  
Moreover, China’s foreign trade in constant dollars has grown at an average rate of about 
15 percent annually since 1979, and FDI has grown so spectacularly that China has been 
continually ranked as the largest developing country receiving FDI since 1992.  Overall, 
China has possessed the world’s fastest growing major industrial economy since the early 
1980s, with its overall per capita GDP in constant yuan having roughly quadrupled 
between 1978 and 2001.107 
According to Alagappa’s explanatory framework, sustained economic 
development decreases the weight of coercion in governance and the political power and 
influence of the military through the combined effect of its consequences, such as: 1) the 
state’s reduced role in managing the allocation of goods and services, which gives rise to 
privately-owned institutions and enterprises as political actors; 2) the emergence of 
middle and working classes which may seek political participation; 3) the development of 
civil society, which gives rise to the political, economic, and social forces that pose a 
variety of challenges to the state; 4) the development of administrative and legal 
institutions needed to manage state problems through non-coercive measures and to 
improve governance; 5) the increasing emphasis on transparency and accountability in 
governance, especially with regards to the use of force; and 6) the integration of the 
national economy into the global market, which increases the salience of factors in the 
international context.  In short, sustained economic development ultimately produces “a 
complex state, society, and economy” of which are especially resistant to the use of force 
in governance and well beyond the administrative capacities of the military and other 
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coercive state institutions, thus necessitating the development and strengthening of non-
coercive state institutions to administer an increasingly developed nation-state.108 
Indeed, sustained economic development has made China’s state, society, 
and economy more complex and less vulnerable to the use of force as a dependable tool 
of governance.  In the wake of Tiananmen, state reliance on coercion to govern China has 
become less practical, thus reducing the political power and influence of the PLA relative 
to non-coercive state institutions.  Sustained economic development in China has 
produced an increasingly prosperous civil society, whereby a significant and expanding 
portion of Chinese consumers can not only afford basic items such as refrigerators and 
television sets, but also personal luxuries such as cars, computers, mobile phones, and 
designer clothes.  It has also produced an increasingly well-informed, organized, and self-
mobilized society that has especially flourished in the information age, as access to 
various media, ideas, and other data has become increasingly available.109 
Moreover, China’s transition to a market-based economy has led to the 
emergence of political, economic, and social forces within civil society that pose a 
variety of administrative challenges to the state and that the military is ill-equipped to 
manage through non-coercive measures.  Civil society organizations in China - such as 
consumer advocacy groups, labor unions, industrial associations, religious organizations, 
environmental groups, and intellectual organizations – have greatly expanded during the 
reform era and exerted some degree of influence on the CCP’s approach to state 
governance, either as officially or unofficially sanctioned groups.110  As a result of 
China’s economic liberalization, private enterprises - both domestic and foreign - have 
also emerged as politically influential forces themselves.  Private entrepreneurs, foreign 
investors, and the expanding middle and working classes have necessitated the 
development and strengthening of China’s administrative and legal institutional 
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frameworks to provide protection for industrial resources, assets, and investments.  
International financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF have also become 
major political actors in China, as they are brought in to help manage China’s 
increasingly complex economy while bolstering the significance of non-coercive 
measures in state governance through robust economic institutionalization. 
Overall, state governance via coercion has become an increasingly 
impractical instrument for managing China’s vibrant state, society, and economy today, 
as it may jeopardize political legitimacy.  While coercion - the key asset of the military – 
has become less salient in governing China, non-coercive state institutions have become 
more significant in governance.  For post-Deng civilian leaders to sufficiently manage an 
increasingly complex China and to secure legitimacy of the current political system, non-
coercive state institutions have thus been increasingly strengthened via sustained 
economic development to address the growing variety of political, economic, and social 
challenges through non-coercive means. 
According to Alagappa’s explanatory framework, legitimacy of a political 
system may be ascertained by investigating “the existence of shared norms and values, 
their translation into widely accepted institutions, conformity with established rules in the 
acquisition and exercise of state power, and consent of the governed.”111  To illustrate 
increasing legitimacy of China’s political system requires exploring the norms governing 
Chinese politics, the significance of non-coercive state institutions in governance 
(especially those dealing with law), the status of China’s legitimacy in the international 
context, and the degree of consent by the governed. 
As a result of Deng’s political reforms, the reestablishment of norms 
governing Chinese elite politics restored a significant degree of political stability back to 
the CCP, and has thus increased legitimacy of China’s political system as it marked a 
significant break from the political instability and internal strife of the past that have led 
to dire consequences for China.  One of the most significant norms implemented was the 
adoption of written rules regulating intra-party politics, explicated in the milestone 
document Some Principles on the Party’s Internal Politics, published in February 1980.  
                                                 




This document granted a number of basic rights to CCP members to help curb the 
devastating impact of political defeats in power struggles.  Although the practice of 
upholding these rights remains uncertain, the cases of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang – 
both of whom were gradually eased out of their high-ranking positions after being 
defeated in power struggles – provide some historical evidence that political defeats in 
the reform era have not resulted in harsh internal purges like those under Mao.112 
Another significant norm implemented under Deng was the mandatory 
retirement of party and government officials.  Established in 1982, the mandatory 
retirement system imposed a two-term limit on all party and government positions and set 
the retirement age at 65 for ministers, provincial party secretaries, and governors and at 
60 for their deputies.  The two-term limit and established retirement ages had the 
combined effect of drastically changing the ruling elite’s composition from a body of 
poorly-educated, aging revolutionaries to the current group of college-educated, middle-
aged technocrats.  Moreover, the mandatory retirement system reduced intra-party 
conflict by removing revolutionary leaders unwilling to give up their positions of power 
to make room for more regularized, predictable, and feasible promotions of the next 
generation of leadership, and by also reducing the incentive of post-revolutionary civilian 
leaders to engage in political conspiracies for career advancement.  The system has also 
created a ruling elite whose members are now mostly college-educated and share similar 
political views and experiences to facilitate a higher degree of consensus on policy 
matters.  In essence, the mandatory retirement system further stabilized intra-party 
politics and thus increased legitimacy of China’s political system under the CCP, as it 
facilitated the institutionalization of leadership successions to prevent the perpetuation of 
power for party and government officials.113 
In addition to formalized party rules and the mandatory retirement system, 
Deng adopted limited competition for party offices in 1987 to promote intra-party 
democracy and, more importantly, to prevent the rise of radical liberals and conservatives 
within the party.  This reform officially instructs that the number of candidates for 
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representation in the party congress must exceed the number of available positions by 
twenty percent.   Similarly, the number of candidates for full and candidate memberships 
in the Central Committee must exceed the number of available positions by five and 
twelve percent, respectively.  While limited competition has had little success in 
consolidating intra-party democracy within the CCP, it has nevertheless considerably 
thwarted the elections and reelections of controversial party and government officials 
who may potentially threaten the stability of intra-party politics.114 
The overall effect of reestablished norms governing elite politics helped 
restore order to a party crippled by the harsh internal purges and mass political campaigns 
under Mao.  These norms have helped facilitate the last two leadership successions (i.e., 
Deng to Jiang and Jiang to Hu) with no major political setbacks.  With the ascension of 
Hu Jintao as the current PRC leader, the processes by which political leaders deliberate 
and succeed each other have become much more institutionalized and predictable, and 
have thus lent increasing legitimacy to China’s political system over time, as internal 
stability at the top makes China’s political system less prone to turmoil. 
As previously stated, non-coercive state institutions have gradually 
strengthened over the course of the last two decades via sustained economic development 
to manage an increasingly complex China.  Steps toward revamping and restructuring 
non-coercive state institutions beginning under Deng’s political reforms have helped 
improve China’s state governance and political stability, and have thus far helped 
increase legitimacy of the political system.  As China’s market economy has necessitated 
the development of the state’s overall capacity to deal with problems through means 
other than coercion, non-coercive state institutions have consequently gained significance 
as vital and practical tools of governance.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the 
Ministry of State Security (MSS), and the CCP International Liaison Department, for 
instance, all feature prominently in managing international security problems today.  
Both the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation deal extensively with issues related to China’s growing economy in the 
domestic and international context.  In short, non-coercive state institutions matter more 
                                                 




than ever in the face of today’s increasingly developed China.  As these institutions 
become increasingly capable in managing a wide variety of state problems and 
challenges, China’s political system will garner increasing legitimacy. 
Among the most important non-coercive state institutions that have 
strengthened during the reform era have been the National People’s Congress (NPC) and 
China’s legal system.  Since the early 1990s, the NPC has increasingly strengthened and 
asserted itself as China’s supreme lawmaking body with a legitimate role in formulating 
and implementing legislation.  Over the past two decades, it has developed a substantial 
body of formal laws and regulations to govern China during the reform era, marking a 
drastic break from the virtual lawlessness of the Mao era.  Members of the NPC now 
actively sponsor their own legislative bills, debate over legislation, vote for or against 
important bills, and possess the power to accept or reject the CCP’s nominees for senior 
executive posts.  In the past, the NPC’s approval of legislative bills and CCP nominations 
for official posts were virtually automatic.  Since the early 1990s, however, the NPC has 
shown signs of assertiveness in its approval and rejection of a number of bills and 
nominations regardless of the CCP, although the NPC has avoided direct confrontation 
with the party on key legislation.  Although far from being a fully independent legislative 
body, the NPC has nevertheless increasingly strengthened to become a politically 
powerful institution that may potentially challenge the CCP’s monopoly of power in the 
future.115 
The composition and credibility of the NPC have also improved during the 
reform era.  In the past, NPC posts were generally assigned to those officials approaching 
the twilight of their careers, but now these posts are being occupied by powerful political 
figures and have included the appointments of retired party officials, thus giving the NPC 
more institutional power and credibility as the supreme lawmaking body in China.  The 
NPC’s permanent professional staff has grown significantly during the reform era, 
expanding from fewer than twenty members in 1978 to more than 2,000 in 1990, thus 
enhancing its institutional capacities to formulate and implement legislation.  The profile 
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of NPC deputies has also drastically changed since 1978.  The average deputy in the NPC 
is now younger and more educated than their predecessors.  The number of non-party 
deputies in the NPC increased slightly between 1978 and 1993.  Intellectuals and 
government officials now comprise nearly half of the congress, while the combined 
representation in the NPC by soldiers, peasants, and workers – who collectively make up 
the CCP’s principal base of support - has dropped from about two-thirds of the NPC to 
less than a third.  Most importantly, because of its growing strength, independence, and 
credibility, the NPC has been increasingly viewed by Chinese citizens as a legitimate 
institutional channel for communicating their grievances.116 
China’s legal system has undertaken extensive reforms since 1978 to 
provide a legal framework for China’s market economy to operate within the domestic 
and global markets, and to prevent the political excesses that may give rise to another 
Cultural Revolution - a period marked by virtual lawlessness.  Between 1978 and 1994, 
the NPC enacted nearly 175 laws, and local people’s congresses passed an additional 
3,000.  Most of China’s laws have borrowed extensively from Western legal traditions, 
doctrines, concepts, and terminology.117 
Despite the legal system’s poor enforcement of the law, an increasing 
number of Chinese citizens and businessmen continue to rely on the legal system to 
protect their personal rights and property claims.  Since the legal reforms began under 
Deng, the number of litigation cases has risen dramatically in Chinese courts.  Between 
1986 and 1996, commercial litigation cases over contract disputes increased 387 percent, 
administrative litigation cases against the government 12,483 percent, and civil litigation 
cases over personal rights 212 percent.  Over time, a strong sense of and desire for legal 
protection, especially with regards to personal and property rights, seems to have 
developed among Chinese citizens according to opinion polls from the mid-1990s.  
Moreover, this development may have influenced the government’s attitude toward 
embracing more robust legal reforms to garner more legitimacy.  In the 1990s, for 
instance, the NPC adopted a law that permits Chinese citizens to sue the government for 
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abuse of power by government officials – and accordingly, the number of cases has 
increased annually, with a reported success rate of about 40 percent.118 
Overall, China has been gradually strengthening the role of its legal 
system in governing state-society relations.  Since the beginning of the reform era, 
Beijing has recognized the vital role that law plays in improving state governance in 
China, even though top leaders have largely emphasized rule by law as opposed to rule of 
law.119  The rapid growth and rising independence of the legal community in China has 
been one major trend indicative of the strengthening of China’s legal system, as the 
number of lawyers and private law firms in China have increased substantially during the 
reform era.  Moreover, the creation of an extensive body of law by the NPC and the 
increasing growth of politically influential interest groups - such as private entrepreneurs, 
foreign investors, and the expanding middle and working classes – have, for the moment, 
spurred the development of an acceptable legal framework, which may possibly lead to 
the future development of a more robust one, given China’s rapid pace of growth.  
Although the CCP government has been cautious in accelerating institutional reforms, 
China’s legal system has nevertheless cultivated an increasing emphasis on personal 
rights, property rights, and governance according to law.  Despite the absence of 
democratization and rule of law, China’s legal system, at the present, does provide an 
adequate legal framework, which, according to Randall Peerenboom, is currently 
transitioning from rule by law to a version of rule of law – the extent of which has been 
actively debated by scholars.120 
Although the strengthening of other non-coercive state institutions have 
also been significant factors lending greater legitimacy to China’s political system, the 
strengthening of the NPC and China’s legal system have been especially important.  Both 
have codified formal laws and regulations, placed emphasis on personal and property 
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rights, and instilled the primacy of law in state governance, despite their weaknesses due 
to the limits placed on both institutions by the CCP.  More importantly, the NPC and the 
legal system, as previously noted in this chapter, currently possess increasing military 
oversight and responsibilities, along with codified laws and regulations officially 
subordinating the military under these institutions – thus laying the groundwork for 
consolidating civilian control of the PLA.121 
Formal recognition of the PRC as a full-fledged member within the 
international system of nation-states has gradually consolidated the legitimacy of China’s 
political system over the course of the past several decades.  Formal recognition of the 
PRC largely resulted from two immensely significant developments in PRC foreign 
affairs: 1) the United States’ withdrawal of its containment policy toward the PRC in the 
early 1970s, which led to Beijing’s replacement of Taipei (Republic of China (ROC)) as 
the sole representative government of “China” in the United Nations in 1971; and 2) the 
United States’ official acknowledgment of Beijing as the legitimate government of all of 
China in 1979, which established formal diplomatic relations between the PRC and the 
United States. 
These major developments have allowed China to gain entry into 
international organizations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, which have been 
greatly beneficial to China’s economic development through much-needed international 
financial aid, nation-building assistance, and foreign capital and investments.  In addition, 
China’s membership in these international organizations has also helped in two other 
ways.  First, it helped stimulate the development and strengthening of non-coercive state 
institutions to help manage China’s growing state, society, and economy.  Second, as 
international organizations often reinforce norms that discourage the use of force as a 
primary tool for governance, China’s membership in these organizations has thus 
emphasized reliance upon diplomatic instruments to resolve international conflicts of 
interest through negotiations, as well as reinforced conformity to the practice of non-
coercive measures widely accepted by the international community.  Indeed, one of the 
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most notable trends for China throughout the reform era has been its increasing 
membership and active participation in international organizations, such as the United 
Nations in 1971, the World Bank, the IMF, and the Asian Development Bank beginning 
in 1981, Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1991, Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1996 (as a full dialogue partner in ASEAN + 3), and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001.  Despite the sensitive issues - such 
as human rights, the absence of democratization, and Taiwan independence - which 
occasionally arise, formal recognition of the PRC within the international system as the 
sole legitimate government of all of China has helped secure the legitimacy of China’s 
current political system over time. 
Perhaps the most important indicator of political legitimacy is the degree 
of consent to the existing political system accorded by the governed.  Although consent is 
especially difficult to measure, there are nevertheless a number of factors indicating at 
least a degree of tacit acceptance of the current political system by citizens in China.  
These factors include a new social contract governing state-society relations in China, 
gradual attempts at improving state governance, prolonged political and social stability, 
and the adoption of Chinese nationalism as the current governing ideology. 
The relationship between the state and society in China has changed so 
dramatically that a new social contract, whereby the prior restraints on personal and 
economic freedoms have been lifted in exchange for the public’s tacit acceptance of the 
CCP’s authority, seems to have emerged, although this contract has never been officially 
articulated by Beijing.  Despite strong challenges from political dissidents during the Pro-
Democracy Movement in 1989, the notion of “personal freedom for CCP authority” has 
seemingly consolidated in China - expressed in a variety of dramatic changes in state-
society relations during the reform era.  Personal liberties of Chinese citizens, for 
instance, have expanded greatly - today, it is common to hear individuals make 
complaints against the CCP government in public without fear of arrest or punishment, 
although there are certainly limits to which individuals can independently organize for 
their respective causes.  Chinese citizens can also freely choose their own lifestyles, 




passports to travel abroad - provided they have sufficient funds to do so.  Even Beijing’s 
controversial one child policy has been relaxed.  In addition, Beijing’s commitment to 
structural economic liberalization has produced sustained growth in the level of material 
prosperity among Chinese citizens – hence, an increasing number of Chinese consumers 
can now afford the basic items and personal luxuries that were once inaccessible to them.  
Along with increased personal liberties and improved material prosperity, the level of 
political repression has dropped dramatically since the reform era began.  Despite its 
tenuous credibility with the international community, Beijing has significantly reduced its 
political repression by shifting its strategy from mass to selective repression, whereby the 
CCP government mostly targets the most prominent political dissidents.122 
Beijing has made gradual attempts at improving state governance, 
especially in the vast countryside where over 70 percent of China’s population resides 
and where governance has been the most difficult for Beijing, through the introduction of 
semi-open competitive elections at the village level.  These elections, first introduced 
back in the mid-1980s and then expanded throughout China in 1988, have reached nearly 
four-fifths of Chinese villages, with a large portion of village officials having gone 
through at least one election.  Elections for village official posts have been genuinely 
competitive (whereby there are more candidates than available positions), have posted 
high turnover rates on occasion, and have actually improved rural governance in Chinese 
villages, as tax collection and official accountability improved while crime and birth rates 
in villages fell after elections were introduced.  Moreover, the relationship between the 
central and provincial governments has become much more institutionalized.  Not only 
does Beijing command direct authority to appoint and fire every top provincial official, it 
is also much more willing to discipline and even dismiss officials on the spot for 
disobedience of central policies than it had been in the past.  During the Mao era, the 
average tenure of provincial governors, for instance, was about six years.  During the 
reform era, however, average tenure declined steadily to about three to four years, thus 
indicating the increased political clout of the central government over the provinces.123 
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Another significant factor has been the ability of the post-Deng 
governments under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao to maintain perhaps China’s most stable 
period in the last 150 years while sustaining high levels of growth and development in 
China’s state, society, and economy since Tiananmen.  Many Chinese citizens eagerly 
wish to move beyond their distressing past of foreign invasions, regional divisions, civil 
war, mass political movements, and domestic violence.  Both Jiang and Hu have been 
successful in maintaining a relatively stable environment that has given most Chinese 
citizens expectations of economic progress rather than of political and social chaos, thus 
lending added legitimacy to China’s political system over time despite the absence of 
democratization.124 
Along with the decline of communism in the post-Cold War era, Beijing’s 
adoption of Chinese nationalism as its governing ideology actually strengthened the 
legitimacy of the CCP government and its political system.  Although the suppression of 
the Pro-Democracy Movement in 1989 severely damaged the legitimacy of the CCP, 
many citizens who had supported demonstrators at Tiananmen began to accept Beijing’s 
decision to use force to avoid political and social chaos.  The fall of the Communist Bloc 
helped reinforce the desire among Chinese citizens to avoid the instability that may have 
occurred if China’s political system had been violently overthrown.  Even while 
Tiananmen had dealt a severe blow to its legitimacy, the CCP still maintained power, but 
needed an alternative source of legitimacy to sustain its rule over China while 
communism fell to the wayside.  Thus, the CCP began to revive traditional Chinese 
values - such as political and social stability, obedience, and harmony - as it shifted 
toward the use of Chinese nationalism as its governing ideology in the aftermath of 
Tiananmen.125 
Beijing’s use of Chinese nationalism has been very effective in sustaining 
and advancing the legitimacy of the CCP government, since most citizens in China share 
a common Chinese identity and have a vested interest in preserving Chinese culture.  
With over ninety percent of China’s population consisting of Han ethnicity, the degree of 
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ethnic divisions, which had facilitated the fall of the Soviet Union, is relatively limited in 
both scale and significance in China, although ethnic conflicts within the innermost 
provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang still exist.  Moreover, Beijing has greatly benefited from 
a surging tide of Chinese nationalism among its citizens, as there has been an increasing 
trend of anti-American sentiment in China since the early 1990s.  The failure of Beijing’s 
bid in 1993 to host the 2000 Summer Olympics, for instance, resulted in a furious public 
protest against Americans, whereby many Chinese citizens believed the United States had 
opposed China’s bid in order to disrupt China’s political and economic goals.  The 1999 
U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade sparked an even larger wave of 
protests throughout China.126 
Overall, China’s sustained level of economic development and the 
increasing legitimacy of China’s political system together have served as powerful 
structural constraints that have attenuated the reliance on coercion in governance over 
time in both the domestic and international context.  Thus accordingly, the political 
power and influence of the PLA relative to non-coercive state institutions have reduced in 
the post-Deng era - as evidenced by the overall reduction in the size of PLA forces since 
the reform era began, the lack of PLA representation in the Politburo Standing 
Committee, the declining military profile in other high-level party committees, the 
military’s apparent divestiture of commercial enterprises and activities, the corresponding 
loss of extra-budgetary revenues which makes the military more dependent upon state 
coffers, official subordination of the PLA under the NPC and legal system, and the 
overall strengthening of non-coercive state institutions relative to the coercive state 
institutions. 
As previously stated in Chapter I, the interplay of coercion, economic 
development, and political legitimacy can explain long-term civil-military changes and 
continuities; it cannot, however, adequately explain specific developments in civil-
military relations.  Hence, the explanatory framework must shift its focus onto the agency 
level of explanation.  This leads to the second part of Alagappa’s explanatory framework 
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concerning the interplay of interests, power, and beliefs of the key civilian and military 
institutions and actors involved, as well as the influence of the power and beliefs of civil 
society and international actors. 
b. Interplay of Interests, Power, and Beliefs 
Explaining specific developments in civil-military relations requires 
observing the outcome of the interaction between the interests, power, and beliefs of the 
key civilian and military institutions and actors involved while accounting for the 
influence of the power and beliefs of civil society and international actors.  In situations 
where political systems are consolidated, political beliefs primarily determine the pattern 
of civil-military relations, yet the content of civil-military relations must account for the 
interests and distribution of power among the key civilian institutions (e.g. the legislature 
and communist party) and military institutions (e.g. the armed forces and paramilitary 
forces) involved.  In contrast, in situations where political systems are contested or in 
transition, the interests and distribution of power among the key civilian and military 
institutions and actors involved ultimately determine specific developments in civil-
military relations.  In both situations, the influence of civil society (e.g. citizen-organized 
special interest groups, private enterprises, official media, consumers, and labor unions) 
and international actors (in particular, major world powers, international institutions, and 
foreign media) are also likely to affect the pattern and content of civil-military 
relations.127 
China’s political system is increasingly garnering legitimacy with 
sustained economic development and the emergence of non-coercive state institutions to 
help manage China’s increasingly complex state, society, and economy (as observed in 
the previous section of this chapter).  Because of its enduring authoritarian nature, 
however, China’s political system has yet to fully consolidate into a political framework 
that is entirely accepted by all Chinese citizens.  Nevertheless, China’s political system is 
in the midst of a transition in which Beijing may likely promote further political 
liberalization in the future.  Because China has changed so dramatically within the last 
several decades, George Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham have cited three reasons why the 
                                                 




CCP government will likely opt to liberalize its current political system: 1) China’s 
altered civil society has become increasingly difficult for party and state officials to 
manage with the inflexible political and social structures currently in place; 2) political 
suppression of independent social organizations obstructs further gains in China’s 
economic development; and 3) the PRC leadership under Hu Jintao will likely promote 
reform-minded leaders to drive political reforms.128  Thus, as China’s political system 
remains in transition, the interests and distribution of power among the key civilian and 
military institutions and actors involved predominantly explain the specific developments 
in civil-military relations in China. 
While civilian leaders in the CCP have been attentive to the interests and 
power of civil society, the state institutional apparatus, and external actors, they have 
been especially attentive to the interests and power of the PLA, since it is the key 
institution that protects the hegemonic position of the CCP.  As previously discussed in 
this chapter, the generational shifts in the civilian and military leaderships over time have 
given rise to two distinct groups: 1) technocratic civilian leaders in the CCP who are 
skilled in bureaucratic management and largely operate within the institutional 
boundaries of state governance, but lack military experience; and 2) professionalized 
military leaders who are mostly concerned with the ongoing development of its 
institutions via professionalization and resource procurement, but lack political expertise.  
The generational shifts marked a significant break from the past, when the CCP and the 
PLA had shared virtually the same group of senior personnel in command.  Thus, with 
increasing differentiation, the interests and distribution of power of civilian and military 
leaderships have also changed over time.  Since civilian party leaders of the post-
revolutionary generation seem unlikely to command the vast personal authority once 
accorded to both Mao and Deng, they must continually cater to the interests of the PLA 
to build political support while establishing civilian supremacy over the military. 
Moreover, with the drastic decline of communism in the post-Cold War 
era, the ideological basis for upholding party supremacy and adhering to military 
subordination under the CCP has eroded.  To maintain their claim to legitimacy, civilian 
                                                 




party leaders have adopted Chinese nationalism as the CCP’s governing ideology - 
shifting the party’s focus from promoting communist principles to advancing the interests 
of the entire Chinese nation - and have maintained additional claims to CCP legitimacy 
with sustained economic development and continuing political and social stability in 
China.129 
Despite increasing differentiation between the party and the military, the 
PLA continues to accept and protect party supremacy, as evidenced by its role in the 
suppression of the Pro-Democracy Movement at Tiananmen Square in 1989.  The PLA’s 
subordination under the CCP had historically rested upon communist ideology, the 
charismatic personal leaderships of Mao, Deng, and other revolutionary leaders, and the 
inculcated belief in party supremacy that firmly entrenched the principle of civilian 
control within the PLA ever since its creation in 1927 and thereafter the establishment of 
the PRC in 1949.  Over time, however, the foundations for civilian party control of the 
PLA have changed.  As communism has gone into drastic decline and charismatic leaders 
of the revolutionary generation have passed from the scene, the ideological rhetoric of 
“class struggles” and “contradictions” no longer provides the basis for PLA 
subordination.  Instead, PLA support of the CCP has been based primarily upon the 
performance of civilian leaders to sustain China as a politically stable and economically 
prosperous nation-state, as well as the ability of the party to satisfy the military’s 
interests.  With increasing specialization in their respective professions, civilian and 
military leaderships continue to lack the common experiences that were once essential to 
the organic party-army connection between the CCP and the PLA.  Thus, although it 
remains essentially a party army, the PLA has increasingly appeared as a distinct 
institution separate from the party in the post-Deng era.130 
In the post-Deng era, the PLA is no longer the power broker that it once 
was in the past.  Compared to their revolutionary counterparts, military leaders of the 
post-revolutionary generation lack the same level of political assets and informal 
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connections with civilian leaders, and therefore must increasingly rely upon formal 
institutional channels and bureaucratic mechanisms to address their concerns.  With the 
emergence of stronger non-coercive state institutions (such as the NPC, the legal system, 
financial institutions, state ministries, and party administrative organs), the PLA must 
now compete more than ever with an increasing variety of state actors for budgetary 
allocations and government resources.  Moreover, civil society in China today is much 
more robust and virtually independent of the PLA for its services in political, economic, 
and social development and mobilization.  In addition, the institutional capacity needed to 
manage China’s increasingly complex state, society, and economy is well beyond that of 
the PLA.  Despite its decreasing power and influence relative to civilian leadership, civil 
society, and non-coercive state institutions, the PLA remains a significant political force 
that appears to be becoming increasingly bureaucratic in nature as the generational shift 
and military professionalization continue through the post-Deng era.131 
As previously observed in this chapter, China’s sustained economic 
development has necessarily spurred increasing consolidation and strengthening of non-
coercive state institutions, such as the NPC and China’s legal system, to manage China’s 
ever-growing state, society, and economy in the post-Deng era.  With the emergence of 
these institutions, the significance of coercion in governance has reduced, as these 
institutions have increasingly facilitated reliance on the exercise of non-coercive 
measures to address China’s political, economic, and social problems while limiting the 
role of coercion in governing China.  More importantly, non-coercive state institutions 
have arisen as emerging powerful actors in pursuit of their own institutional interests.  
Among the most significant institutions have been the NPC and the legal system, which 
have sought to maintain their powerful positions as de facto institutional checks on 
military power by reinforcing civilian control of the military through formal laws and 
regulations that officially subordinate the armed forces under civilian leadership and 
institutions. 
Of major significance to civil-military relations in China has been the 
growing relationship between the PLA and the PRC State.  Since the reform era began, 
                                                 




the PLA has gradually developed from a strictly party army into a party-state military in 
which the CCP and the PRC State both monitor and supervise the PLA through their 
respective institutions.  Deng’s reforms, however, had institutionalized increasing 
separation between the party and the state, which has resulted in a division of 
responsibilities in which the CCP provides overall policy guidance, and the PRC State 
exercises overall administration and implementation of policy guidance from the top.  
Thus accordingly, the PRC state apparatus has assumed increasing responsibility and 
oversight over defense-related affairs, which has led to increasing links between the PLA 
and the PRC State.  Moreover, the relationship between the PLA and the PRC State has 
further consolidated with the increasing emphasis on “rule by law” in state governance, 
the increasing military dependency on state budgetary allocations (especially in the wake 
of the PLA’s divestiture of commercial enterprises and its subsequent diminishing source 
of extra-budgetary revenues), and the increasing regularization and codification of 
military affairs in relation to the PRC State.  Despite its top official positions being 
occupied by senior party leadership and periodic efforts by the CCP to denounce talks of 
guojiahua (nationalization of the PLA) in the official PRC media, the PRC State is 
nevertheless on the rise to becoming a potential challenger to the CCP’s monopoly of 
power as the significance, power, and influence of its institutions increase and its 
relationship to the PLA strengthens.132 
In the post-Deng era, civil society in China has drastically transformed 
into a robust, dynamic entity.  Civil society has become much more self-organized and 
possesses the potential to mobilize as a significant counterforce to resist the power of the 
party, state, military, and other key institutions and actors.  It has also become much less 
dependent on the state and the party, more open to new ideas and values concerning state 
governance and state-society relations, and less vulnerable to the ideological influences 
imposed by the CCP government.  Moreover, the ability of the CCP government to 
control civil society has eroded as a result of the significant decline of the commune 
system, the work unit (or danwei) system, urban neighborhood committees, and state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) – all of this coupled by the rapid growth of the private sector, 
                                                 




privatized housing, and per capita incomes.  Thus, civil society in China has shifted the 
balance of power in its favor through the emergence of powerful actors within civil 
society that vigorously seek to advance their own interests (these actors include farmers, 
the unemployed, consumers, industry associations, labor unions, religious groups and 
movements, special interest groups such as environmental organizations, official media, 
and even separatist groups).133  The collective power of these actors in civil society 
creates little incentive for the CCP government to rely on coercive measures via the 
military to deal with the political, economic, and social challenges posed in the domestic 
front, thus driving the need for developing and strengthening of non-coercive state 
institutions to manage civil society in China. 
While China has historically been affected by changes in the international 
context, China has been especially more vulnerable to developments in the external 
environment in the post-Deng era - which in turn have shaped China’s domestic 
environment.  With the fall of the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc in Eastern 
Europe, communism has lost much of its support worldwide, as few communist regimes 
still remain in power or even truly adhere to the tenets of their own ideologies.  China’s 
transition to a market-based economy and its integration into the global market economy 
has only further invalidated communist principles in China.  Thus, Chinese communism 
has lost virtually all of its credibility and is no longer the reliable ideological basis for 
maintaining civilian control of the PLA in the post-Cold War era (Chinese nationalism 
has since become its replacement as the governing ideology). 
China’s transition to a market-based economy and its integration into the 
global market economy has also increased China’s exposure to foreign and global 
economic developments, which have thus far helped develop and reinforce China’s 
institutional capacity to maintain political and social stability without primarily relying 
upon coercive measures for governance.  Since the reform era began, China has become 
significantly dependent upon foreign trade, capital, and investments to sustain its 
continuing high level of economic development, as a significant portion of China’s 
                                                 





domestic economy is vastly linked to the global economy.  With most of its exports going 
toward the United States, Japan, South Korea, and other developed nation-states, China 
has had little incentive to upset its current trade balance with these countries, although the 
potential for conflict exists as some countries may appear to be challenging China’s 
rising power in Asia.  Nevertheless, China has had more incentive to cooperate with 
foreign countries to improve its domestic economic and social conditions by developing 
its economic institutions through foreign assistance from international financial 
organizations. 
International media has emerged as a significant force in reducing the 
weight of coercion in governance in China, and, by extension, decreasing the political 
power and influence of the PLA and other coercive state institutions.  With representative 
offices in China, international media has served as a neutral global watchdog, ready to 
report to the world on incidents of state coercion, such as the 1989 suppression of the 
Pro-Democracy Movement at Tiananmen Square, which attracted worldwide attention 
and led to harsh criticisms of the CCP government in both the domestic and international 
fronts.  Moreover, with the ubiquitous nature of international media today, major world 
powers and international organizations - such as the United States, the European Union, 
the United Nations, and Amnesty International – are now much more capable of 
monitoring for incidents of state coercion in China with the help of news correspondents 
and reporters around the world.  Thus, in the wake of Tiananmen, international media has 
significantly constrained Beijing from readily employing coercive measures against its 
own citizens. 
Overall, as China’s political system remains in transition, the interplay of 
the interests and power of the CCP, the PLA, the PRC State, non-coercive state 
institutions, civil society, and international actors largely explain the specific 
developments in civil-military relations in China.  Therefore, explanations of the recent 
events in PRC civil-military relations previously discussed in this chapter - such as the 
1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the 1998 PLA Divestiture of Commercial Enterprises, and 
the 2001 EP-3 Crisis - are rooted in the degree of congruence (or divergence) between the 





In sum, recent events in PRC civil-military relations in the post-Deng era – such 
as the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the 1998 PLA Divestiture of Commercial 
Enterprises, the 2001 EP-3 Crisis, the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
Crisis, the 2003 Ming 361 Submarine Accident, and the 2003 Shenzhou-5 Manned Space 
Mission - have suggested that the relationship between the CCP and the PLA has become 
increasingly less intimate and more bureaucratic in nature as the party and the military 
increasingly differentiate from each other. 
In applying Alagappa’s investigative framework, the current balance of civil-
military relations in the post-Deng era has been leaning toward increasing civilian 
supremacy, which characterizes the nature of the relationship between the CCP and the 
PLA, as civilian leaders possess ultimate jurisdiction over political participation, 
socioeconomic activities, and illegal activities; command a larger share of jurisdictional 
power regarding the military’s institutional autonomy; and split ultimate decision-making 
authority with the PLA in security policymaking. 
In applying Alagappa’s explanatory framework, China’s sustained level of 
economic development and the increasing legitimacy of China’s political system help 
explain the decreasing weight of coercion in governance in China and, by extension, the 
associated reduction in the political power and influence of the military relative to non-
coercive state institutions over time.  Explanations of specific developments in PRC civil-
military relations, however, must focus on the interests and power between the CCP, the 





The post-Deng era has witnessed significant developments in the civilian and 
military spheres that have impacted the relationship between the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).  These developments include the 
death of the last revolutionary paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, the generational shifts in 
the civilian and military leaderships, the increasing professionalization of the PLA officer 
corps, and two unprecedented orderly successions of post-revolutionary political 
leadership in the CCP.  Other significant developments, however, have had broader 
consequences for the entire state, society, and economy in China – and, therefore, must 
also be featured in the analysis of civil-military relations.  Such additional developments 
include the decreasing significance of coercion (the key function of the military) in 
governance, the sustained high level of economic development in China, the increasing 
legitimacy of China’s political system, the emergence of a robust civil society in China, 
the rising prominence of international organizations and external actors, and the drastic 
decline of communism worldwide.  To date, most studies on civil-military relations in 
China have focused primarily on party-military interactions with little regard for the 
effects of these other developments.  Therefore, this thesis advances and applies an 
alternative analytical framework developed by Multiah Alagappa for analyzing the nature 
of civil-military relations in China within the context of these developments. 
The explanations and theories of civil-military relations presented in the literature 
review of this thesis have advanced a variety of propositions to explain the numerous 
trends and developments in civil-military relations.  To explain why militaries intervene 
in politics, scholars have proposed a number of factors - such as the degree of military 
professionalization, the types of military missions and roles assigned to the armed forces, 
the weakness of political and state institutions relative to the military, and the strength of 
government performance in maintaining an economically viable nation-state.  Problems 
of a military government in sustaining its legitimacy have been cited as key causes for the 
inherent instability and short lifespan of military regimes.  Various literatures examining 




measures, such as professionalizing the armed forces, restructuring the defense 
establishment under civilian jurisdiction, and instilling democratic beliefs in governance, 
to keep the military out of politics.  Recent theories of civil-military relations have also 
emerged to offer contemporary frameworks for analyzing civil-military relations.  
Michael Desch’s structural theory of civil-military relations asserts that the structure of 
the internal and external threat environment for any given nation-state has an indirect but 
significant effect on the behavior of civilian and military actors over time and thus largely 
determines the pattern of civil-military relations.  In contrast, Peter Feaver’s rationalist 
theory of civil-military relations maintains that the rational, calculated interactions 
between key civilian and military actors principally determine the pattern of civil-military 
relations.  Upon reviewing the literature on civil-military relations in China, four models 
of civilian control – liberal, penetration, symbiosis, and civil-military dualism – have 
been advanced to explain the unique trends and developments in the relationship between 
the CCP and the PLA. 
Although useful concepts can be drawn from the literature review, most of the 
explanations and theories of civil-military relations presented do not effectively explain 
the wide array of developments in civil-military relations in a comprehensive manner.  As 
previously stated, this thesis advances the use of Multiah Alagappa’s analytical 
framework for analyzing civil-military relations in China because it offers the most 
comprehensive analytical framework to date - as it tackles both the structural and agency 
levels of explanation, as well as accounts for other important factors such as the 
significance of the use of force in governance, the power and beliefs of civil society and 
international actors, the legitimacy of political systems, and the level of economic 
development. 
Determining whether civilian supremacy or military domination has characterized 
the current nature of PRC civil-military relations in the post-Deng era required the 
application of the first part of Alagappa’s analytical framework: the investigative 
framework for exploring civil-military changes and continuities.  In particular, the 
investigative framework examined the distribution of ultimate decision-making authority 




areas of governance: political participation, institutional autonomy, security 
policymaking, socioeconomic activities, and illegal activities. 
Political Participation.  While the PLA remains a normal yet significant 
participant in Chinese politics, the scope of the PLA’s political participation has 
significantly declined and its jurisdiction has been largely limited to defense-related 
affairs.  This decline may be attributed to two significant trends that have reduced the 
scope of the military’s political participation: 1) the post-revolutionary generational shifts 
in both the civilian and military leaderships, which have increasingly differentiated 
military leaders from party leaders; and 2) the increasing professionalization of the PLA 
officer corps, which has further fashioned the military as a distinct institution from the 
party.  Thus, as the PLA has become increasingly separate from the party, it has also 
increasingly lost significant political leverage to civilian leaders, who continue to possess 
ultimate jurisdiction over the broad political landscape in China. 
Institutional Autonomy.  Civilian and military leaderships share mixed jurisdiction 
across the wide variety of activities concerning the PLA’s institutional autonomy.  
Nevertheless, civilian leaders command a much larger share of jurisdictional power in 
this area, since they ultimately decide the appointments and rotations of the top senior 
military leadership, establish the defense budget allocations for the military, maintain 
centralized command and control, and set the rules and regulations for how the PLA 
functions in service to the party, the state, and the country.  To gain the military’s 
compliance to civilian control, however, civilian leaders yield some measure of 
institutional autonomy to the PLA.  More specifically, civilian leaders permit the PLA to 
autonomously organize and manage carefully delineated areas, such as defense policies, 
military modernization, recruitment criteria, and promotions of personnel below the ranks 
of the top senior military leadership.  In return for gaining a limited degree of institutional 
autonomy, the PLA refrains from involvement in non-defense related areas, focuses 
largely on military professionalization, and, most importantly, concedes itself to 
unquestioned civilian control. 
Security Policymaking.  The scope of the PLA’s participation in national security 




area of governance necessarily entails military participation.  Ultimate jurisdiction, 
however, is diffused among civilian and military leaders in the post-Deng era.  
Nevertheless, the PLA commands significant influence on national security 
policymaking, as it greatly possesses the principal sources for defining China’s national 
security threat environment, virtually dominates the defense policy subarena, continually 
seeks to influence foreign policymaking, and actively participates as a policy advisor and 
consultant to the civilian leadership in formulating and implementing national strategic 
objectives. 
Socioeconomic Activities.  Jiang Zemin’s order for the PLA’s divestiture of its 
commercial enterprises in 1998 has significantly reduced the PLA’s participation in 
socioeconomic activities, since it has removed the principal source of the military’s extra-
budgetary revenues (most military businesses have been transferred to state control or 
dissolved altogether) and has thus made the PLA increasingly dependent on state 
budgetary allocations.  Despite initial resistance and lingering resentment among some 
military personnel, the largely compliant nature of the PLA’s acceptance and execution 
of Jiang’s order for the divestiture apparently suggests that civilian leaders possess 
ultimate jurisdiction over the military’s socioeconomic activities. 
Illegal Activities.  The 1998 divestiture of commercial enterprises also 
significantly reduced the scope of the PLA’s participation in illegal activities, as military 
corruption largely originated from the PLA’s own business operations.  Moreover, 
civilian leaders command ultimate jurisdiction over the military’s involvement in illegal 
activities - as evidenced by the execution of the civilian leadership’s orders for the 
military’s divestiture of its commercial enterprises, the intense anti-corruption 
campaigns, the special investigations of the PLA’s finances and accounts, and the 
discipline investigations conducted by civilian investigators outside military jurisdiction. 
Upon examining each of the five areas of governance using Alagappa’s 
investigative framework, the scope of military participation has been extensive, although 
its scope in political participation, socioeconomic activities, and illegal activities has been 
significantly declining in recent times.  Despite significant military participation in 




military either shares jurisdiction with civilian leadership (as in the cases of institutional 
autonomy and security policymaking) or defers to civilian jurisdiction (in particular, 
political participation, socioeconomic activities, and illegal activities).  Overall, civilian 
leaders possess ultimate jurisdiction over political participation, socioeconomic activities, 
and illegal activities; command a larger share of jurisdictional power regarding the 
military’s institutional autonomy; and split ultimate decision-making authority with the 
PLA in security policymaking.  In short, the application of Alagappa’s investigative 
framework indicates that the balance of civil-military relations in China leans toward 
increasing civilian supremacy, which has been the current trend characterizing the nature 
of the relationship between the CCP and the PLA in the post-Deng era. 
Explaining how and why civilian leaders continue to exercise control of the PLA 
required the application of the second part of Alagappa’s analytical framework: the 
explanatory framework for explaining civil-military changes and continuities.  The 
explanatory framework explains the nature of civil-military relations as the outcome of 
two sets of processes: 1) the structural-level interplay between the weight of coercion in 
governance, the level of economic development, and the legitimacy of the political 
system; 2) the agency-level interplay between the interests, power, and beliefs of key 
civilian and military institutions and actors involved, as well as those of civil society and 
international actors. 
Interplay of Coercion, Economic Development, and Political Legitimacy.  China’s 
sustained level of economic development has made China’s state, society, and economy 
more complex and less vulnerable to the use of force as a reliable tool of governance.  
Moreover, China’s transition to a market-based economy has led to the emergence of 
political, economic, and social forces within civil society that pose a variety of 
administrative challenges to the state and that the military and other coercive state 
institutions are ill-equipped to manage.  Increasing legitimacy of China’s political system 
has been illustrated by the reestablishment of norms governing Chinese politics that have 
stabilized party leadership successions, the development and strengthening of non-
coercive state institutions (in particular, the National People’s Congress (NPC) and 




recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate government of all of China, and various 
indications of at least a degree of tacit approval of the current political system by Chinese 
citizens - which include the presence of a new social contract governing state-society 
relations in China, whereby more personal freedoms have been granted for the citizens’ 
acceptance of the CCP’s authority. 
Overall, China’s sustained level of economic development and the increasing 
legitimacy of China’s political system have together served as powerful structural 
constraints reducing the significance of coercion in governance in China over time.  
Hence, the political power and influence of the PLA relative to non-coercive state 
institutions have reduced in the post-Deng era - as evidenced by the overall reduction in 
the size of PLA forces since the start of the reform era, the lack of military representation 
in the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), the declining military profile in other high-
level party committees, the military’s apparent divestiture of commercial enterprises and 
activities, the corresponding loss of extra-budgetary revenues which have made the 
military more dependent upon state coffers, the official subordination of the PLA under 
the NPC and the legal system, and the overall strengthening and rising significance of 
non-coercive state institutions relative to the coercive state institutions. 
The interplay of coercion, economic development, and political legitimacy can 
explain civil-military changes and continuities over time; it cannot, however, adequately 
explain specific developments in civil-military relations.  Hence, the explanatory 
framework must shift its focus onto the agency level of explanation, leading to the second 
part of Alagappa’s explanatory framework concerning the interplay of interests, power, 
and beliefs of the key civilian and military institutions and actors involved, as well as the 
influence of the power and beliefs of civil society and international actors. 
Interplay of Interests, Power, and Beliefs.  In general, as China’s political system 
remains in transition, the interplay of the interests and power of the CCP, the PLA, the 
PRC State and its non-coercive state institutions, civil society, and international actors 
principally explain the specific developments in PRC civil-military relations.  Therefore, 
explanations of recent events in PRC civil-military relations - such as the 1995-96 




EP-3 Crisis - are essentially rooted in the degree of congruence (or divergence) between 
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